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Full Idea
The representationalist/intentionalist thesis about perception is that we are not aware of the intrinsic qualities of experience in normal perception; we are instead aware of those objects and their qualities that are specified in the content.
Gist of Idea
One thesis says we are not aware of qualia, but only of objects and their qualities
Source
Barry Maund (Perception [2003], Ch. 9)
Book Ref
Maund,Barry: 'Perception' [Acumen 2003], p.165
A Reaction
If secondary qualities are in the mind, not in objects, how come people always thought they were in objects? Answer: because this thesis is right? The primary mode of the mind is projected outwards, though we can introspect about colours. [Dretske]
7630 | Ryle's dichotomy between knowing how and knowing that is too simplistic [Maund] |
7632 | Perception is sensation-then-concept, or direct-concepts, or sensation-saturated-in-concepts [Maund] |
7635 | Sense-data have an epistemological purpose (foundations) and a metaphysical purpose (explanation) [Maund] |
7637 | Thought content is either satisfaction conditions, or exercise of concepts [Maund, by PG] |
7638 | One thesis says we are not aware of qualia, but only of objects and their qualities [Maund] |
7642 | The Myth of the Given claims that thought is rationally supported by non-conceptual experiences [Maund] |
7640 | Mountains are adverbial modifications of the earth, but still have object-characteristics [Maund] |
7641 | Adverbialism tries to avoid sense-data and preserve direct realism [Maund] |