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Full Idea
The so-called 'myth of the given' is the view that conceptual content can be rationally supported by experiences construed as states with non-conceptual content.
Gist of Idea
The Myth of the Given claims that thought is rationally supported by non-conceptual experiences
Source
Barry Maund (Perception [2003], Ch.10)
Book Ref
Maund,Barry: 'Perception' [Acumen 2003], p.201
A Reaction
The myth is attacked by Sellars and McDowell, the latter claiming that concepts must be embedded in the experiences. Maybe only realism is required to make the Given work. The experiences are definitely of something, and off we go...
| 7630 | Ryle's dichotomy between knowing how and knowing that is too simplistic [Maund] |
| 7632 | Perception is sensation-then-concept, or direct-concepts, or sensation-saturated-in-concepts [Maund] |
| 7635 | Sense-data have an epistemological purpose (foundations) and a metaphysical purpose (explanation) [Maund] |
| 7637 | Thought content is either satisfaction conditions, or exercise of concepts [Maund, by PG] |
| 7638 | One thesis says we are not aware of qualia, but only of objects and their qualities [Maund] |
| 7642 | The Myth of the Given claims that thought is rationally supported by non-conceptual experiences [Maund] |
| 7640 | Mountains are adverbial modifications of the earth, but still have object-characteristics [Maund] |
| 7641 | Adverbialism tries to avoid sense-data and preserve direct realism [Maund] |