more on this theme
|
more from this text
Single Idea 7643
[filed under theme 12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
]
Full Idea
Do we really understand the proposal that we have as many colour concepts as there are shades colour that we can sensibly discriminate?
Gist of Idea
We have far fewer colour concepts than we have discriminations of colour
Source
Gareth Evans (The Varieties of Reference [1980], 7.5)
Book Ref
Evans,Gareth: 'The Varieties of Reference' [OUP 2002], p.229
A Reaction
This is the argument (rejected by McDowell) that experience cannot be conceptual because experience is too rich. We should not confuse lack of concepts with lack of words. I may have a concept of a colour between two shades, but no word for it.
The
23 ideas
from Gareth Evans
|
9041
|
The Causal Theory of Names is wrong, since the name 'Madagascar' actually changed denotation
[Evans]
|
|
9038
|
We must distinguish what the speaker denotes by a name, from what the name denotes
[Evans]
|
|
5823
|
The intended referent of a name needs to be the cause of the speaker's information about it
[Evans]
|
|
9039
|
If descriptions are sufficient for reference, then I must accept a false reference if the descriptions fit
[Evans]
|
|
9040
|
Charity should minimize inexplicable error, rather than maximising true beliefs
[Evans]
|
|
9043
|
We use expressions 'deferentially', to conform to the use of other people
[Evans]
|
|
5824
|
How can an expression be a name, if names can change their denotation?
[Evans]
|
|
9042
|
A private intention won't give a name a denotation; the practice needs it to be made public
[Evans]
|
|
5825
|
Speakers intend to refer to items that are the source of their information
[Evans]
|
|
7639
|
The Homunculus Fallacy explains a subject perceiving objects by repeating the problem internally
[Evans]
|
|
14895
|
'Superficial' contingency: false in some world; 'Deep' contingency: no obvious verification
[Evans, by Macià/Garcia-Carpentiro]
|
|
11881
|
Rigid designators can be meaningful even if empty
[Evans, by Mackie,P]
|
|
16129
|
Evans argues (falsely!) that a contradiction follows from treating objects as vague
[Evans, by Lowe]
|
|
16459
|
Is it coherent that reality is vague, identities can be vague, and objects can have fuzzy boundaries?
[Evans]
|
|
16460
|
Evans assumes there can be vague identity statements, and that his proof cannot be right
[Evans, by Lewis]
|
|
16457
|
There clearly are vague identity statements, and Evans's argument has a false conclusion
[Evans, by Lewis]
|
|
14484
|
If a=b is indeterminate, then a=/=b, and so there cannot be indeterminate identity
[Evans, by Thomasson]
|
|
16224
|
There can't be vague identity; a and b must differ, since a, unlike b, is only vaguely the same as b
[Evans, by PG]
|
|
12580
|
Experiences have no conceptual content
[Evans, by Greco]
|
|
23794
|
Some representational states, like perception, may be nonconceptual
[Evans, by Schulte]
|
|
12575
|
Concepts have a 'Generality Constraint', that we must know how predicates apply to them
[Evans, by Peacocke]
|
|
7643
|
We have far fewer colour concepts than we have discriminations of colour
[Evans]
|
|
16366
|
The Generality Constraint says if you can think a predicate you can apply it to anything
[Evans]
|