more on this theme | more from this thinker
Full Idea
Do we really understand the proposal that we have as many colour concepts as there are shades colour that we can sensibly discriminate?
Gist of Idea
We have far fewer colour concepts than we have discriminations of colour
Source
Gareth Evans (The Varieties of Reference [1980], 7.5)
Book Ref
Evans,Gareth: 'The Varieties of Reference' [OUP 2002], p.229
A Reaction
This is the argument (rejected by McDowell) that experience cannot be conceptual because experience is too rich. We should not confuse lack of concepts with lack of words. I may have a concept of a colour between two shades, but no word for it.
12580 | Experiences have no conceptual content [Evans, by Greco] |
23794 | Some representational states, like perception, may be nonconceptual [Evans, by Schulte] |
12575 | Concepts have a 'Generality Constraint', that we must know how predicates apply to them [Evans, by Peacocke] |
7643 | We have far fewer colour concepts than we have discriminations of colour [Evans] |
16366 | The Generality Constraint says if you can think a predicate you can apply it to anything [Evans] |