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Single Idea 7656

[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism ]

Full Idea

I don't maintain, of course, that human consciousness does not exist; I maintain that it is not what people often think it is.

Gist of Idea

I don't deny consciousness; it just isn't what people think it is

Source

Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.3)

Book Ref

Dennett,Daniel C.: 'Sweet Dreams' [MIT 2005], p.71

A Reaction

I consider Dennett to be as near as you can get to an eliminativist, but he is not stupid. As far as I can see, the modern philosopher's bogey-man, the true total eliminativist, simply doesn't exist. Eliminativists usually deny propositional attitudes.

The 19 ideas with the same theme [there is no such thing as mind, only the brain]:

5997 Dicaearchus said soul does not exist, but is just a configuration of the body [Dicaearchus, by Fortenbaugh]
9285 'Consciousness' is a nonentity, a mere echo of the disappearing 'soul' [James]
3131 Quine expresses the instrumental version of eliminativism [Quine, by Rey]
2344 If we are going to eliminate folk psychology, we must also eliminate folk logic [Putnam]
5800 All mental facts are representation, which consists of informational functions [Dretske]
3377 Elimination can either be by translation or by causal explanation [Kim]
7366 It is arbitrary to say which moment of brain processing is conscious [Dennett]
7380 Visual experience is composed of neural activity, which we find pleasing [Dennett]
4988 Folk psychology may not be reducible, but that doesn't make it false [Kirk,R on Churchland,PM]
4987 Eliminative materialism says folk psychology will be replaced, not reduced [Churchland,PM]
4876 Maybe there is a minimum brain speed for supporting a mind [Dennett]
7656 I don't deny consciousness; it just isn't what people think it is [Dennett]
4984 All meaningful psychological statements can be translated into physics [Kirk,R]
2954 Identity theory likes the identity of lightning and electrical discharges [Lockwood]
3140 If you explain water as H2O, you have reduced water, but not eliminated it [Rey]
3134 Human behaviour can show law-like regularity, which eliminativism can't explain [Rey]
5342 Physicalism doesn't deny that the essence of an experience is more than its neural realiser [Flanagan]
4609 It seems contradictory to be asked to believe that we can be eliminativist about beliefs [Heil]
6630 Eliminativism is incoherent if it eliminates reason and truth as well as propositional attitudes [Lowe]