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Single Idea 7657
[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
]
Full Idea
As long as your homunculi are more stupid and ignorant than the intelligent agent they compose, the nesting of homunculi within homunculi can be finite, bottoming out, eventually, with agents so unimpressive they can be replaced by machines.
Clarification
'Homunculi' are little men
Gist of Idea
Intelligent agents are composed of nested homunculi, of decreasing intelligence, ending in machines
Source
Daniel C. Dennett (Sweet Dreams [2005], Ch.6)
Book Ref
Dennett,Daniel C.: 'Sweet Dreams' [MIT 2005], p.137
A Reaction
[Dennett first proposed this in 'Brainstorms' 1978]. This view was developed well by Lycan. I rate it as one of the most illuminating ideas in the modern philosophy of mind. All complex systems (like aeroplanes) have this structure.
The
71 ideas
from Daniel C. Dennett
2526
|
Philosophers regularly confuse failures of imagination with insights into necessity
[Dennett]
|
2524
|
A language of thought doesn't explain content
[Dennett]
|
2523
|
That every mammal has a mother is a secure reality, but without foundations
[Dennett]
|
2525
|
Maybe language is crucial to consciousness
[Dennett]
|
2527
|
Unconscious intentionality is the foundation of the mind
[Dennett]
|
2529
|
Maybe there can be non-conscious concepts (e.g. in bees)
[Dennett]
|
2528
|
Does consciousness need the concept of consciousness?
[Dennett]
|
2530
|
Could a robot be made conscious just by software?
[Dennett]
|
3158
|
Theories of intentionality presuppose rationality, so can't explain it
[Dennett]
|
3159
|
Beliefs and desires aren't real; they are prediction techniques
[Dennett]
|
7365
|
Dualism wallows in mystery, and to accept it is to give up
[Dennett]
|
7366
|
It is arbitrary to say which moment of brain processing is conscious
[Dennett]
|
7367
|
Perhaps the brain doesn't 'fill in' gaps in consciousness if no one is looking.
[Dennett]
|
7369
|
Brains are essentially anticipation machines
[Dennett]
|
7368
|
Originally there were no reasons, purposes or functions; since there were no interests, there were only causes
[Dennett]
|
7370
|
The brain is controlled by shifting coalitions, guided by good purposeful habits
[Dennett]
|
7371
|
All functionalism is 'homuncular', of one grain size or another
[Dennett]
|
7372
|
In peripheral vision we see objects without their details, so blindsight is not that special
[Dennett]
|
7373
|
Blindsight subjects glean very paltry information
[Dennett]
|
7374
|
Light wavelengths entering the eye are only indirectly related to object colours
[Dennett]
|
7376
|
We can't assume that dispositions will remain normal when qualia have been inverted
[Dennett]
|
7379
|
If an epiphenomenon has no physical effects, it has to be undetectable
[Dennett]
|
7380
|
Visual experience is composed of neural activity, which we find pleasing
[Dennett]
|
7383
|
The psychological self is an abstraction, not a thing in the brain
[Dennett]
|
7381
|
We tell stories about ourselves, to protect, control and define who we are
[Dennett]
|
7382
|
We spin narratives about ourselves, and the audience posits a centre of gravity for them
[Dennett]
|
7385
|
People accept blurred boundaries in many things, but insist self is All or Nothing
[Dennett]
|
7386
|
Selves are not soul-pearls, but artefacts of social processes
[Dennett]
|
7384
|
Words are fixed by being attached to similarity clusters, without mention of 'essences'
[Dennett]
|
7387
|
"Qualia" can be replaced by complex dispositional brain states
[Dennett]
|
7393
|
We can't draw a clear line between conscious and unconscious
[Dennett]
|
7391
|
We can know a lot of what it is like to be a bat, and nothing important is unknown
[Dennett]
|
7394
|
Conscious events can only be explained in terms of unconscious events
[Dennett]
|
14308
|
We can bring dispositions into existence, as in creating an identifier
[Dennett, by Mumford]
|
3804
|
Darwin's idea was the best idea ever
[Dennett]
|
3791
|
Awareness of thought is a step beyond awareness of the world
[Dennett]
|
3794
|
Foreknowledge permits control
[Dennett]
|
3795
|
Causal theories require the "right" sort of link (usually unspecified)
[Dennett]
|
3796
|
The active self is a fiction created because we are ignorant of our motivations
[Dennett]
|
3797
|
I am the sum total of what I directly control
[Dennett]
|
3798
|
An overexamined life is as bad as an unexamined one
[Dennett]
|
3800
|
You can be free even though force would have prevented you doing otherwise
[Dennett, by PG]
|
3801
|
Rationality requires the assumption that things are either for better or worse
[Dennett]
|
3802
|
Why pronounce impossible what you cannot imagine?
[Dennett]
|
3803
|
Can we conceive of a being with a will freer than our own?
[Dennett]
|
4608
|
Minds are hard-wired, or trial-and-error, or experimental, or full self-aware
[Dennett, by Heil]
|
4873
|
What is it like to notice an uncomfortable position when you are asleep?
[Dennett]
|
4872
|
Most people see an abortion differently if the foetus lacks a brain
[Dennett]
|
4875
|
We descend from robots, and our intentionality is composed of billions of crude intentional systems
[Dennett]
|
4874
|
The predecessor and rival of the language of thought hypothesis is the picture theory of ideas
[Dennett]
|
4877
|
Maybe plants are very slow (and sentient) animals, overlooked because we are faster?
[Dennett]
|
4878
|
The materials for a mind only matter because of speed, and a need for transducers and effectors
[Dennett]
|
4879
|
There is no more anger in adrenaline than silliness in a bottle of whiskey
[Dennett]
|
4876
|
Maybe there is a minimum brain speed for supporting a mind
[Dennett]
|
4880
|
Sentience comes in grades from robotic to super-human; we only draw a line for moral reasons
[Dennett]
|
4881
|
Being a person must involve having second-order beliefs and desires (about beliefs and desires)
[Dennett]
|
4882
|
Concepts are things we (unlike dogs) can think about, because we have language
[Dennett]
|
3983
|
Learning is evolution in the brain
[Dennett]
|
3985
|
Biology is a type of engineering, not a search for laws of nature
[Dennett]
|
3984
|
The nature of content is entirely based on its functional role
[Dennett]
|
3987
|
Like the 'centre of gravity', desires and beliefs are abstract concepts with no actual existence
[Dennett]
|
3986
|
The 'intentional stance' is a way of interpreting an entity by assuming it is rational and self-aware
[Dennett]
|
6624
|
Dennett denies the existence of qualia
[Dennett, by Lowe]
|
7654
|
What matters about neuro-science is the discovery of the functional role of the chemistry
[Dennett]
|
7656
|
I don't deny consciousness; it just isn't what people think it is
[Dennett]
|
7655
|
The work done by the 'homunculus in the theatre' must be spread amongst non-conscious agencies
[Dennett]
|
7657
|
Intelligent agents are composed of nested homunculi, of decreasing intelligence, ending in machines
[Dennett]
|
7658
|
Obviously there can't be a functional anaylsis of qualia if they are defined by intrinsic properties
[Dennett]
|
23803
|
States have content if we can predict them well by assuming intentionality
[Dennett, by Schulte]
|
3177
|
You couldn't drive a car without folk psychology
[Dennett]
|
3161
|
If mind is just an explanation, the explainer must have beliefs
[Rey on Dennett]
|