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Single Idea 7691
[filed under theme 10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
]
Full Idea
The actual world is a maximally consistent state-of-affairs combination involving all and only the existent objects, which in turn exist because they are maximally consistent property combinations.
Gist of Idea
The actual world is a consistent combination of states, made of consistent property combinations
Source
Dale Jacquette (Ontology [2002], Ch. 2)
Book Ref
Jacquette,Dale: 'Ontology' [Acumen 2002], p.73
A Reaction
[This extends Idea 7688]. This seems to invite the standard objections to the coherence theory of truth, such as Ideas 5422 and 4745. Is 'maximal consistency' merely a test for actuality, rather than an account of what actuality is?
Related Ideas
Idea 7688
The actual world is a maximally consistent combination of actual states of affairs [Jacquette]
Idea 5422
More than one coherent body of beliefs seems possible [Russell]
Idea 4745
Any coherent set of beliefs can be made more coherent by adding some false beliefs [Engel]
The
31 ideas
from Dale Jacquette
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9456
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Modal logic is multiple systems, shown in the variety of accessibility relations between worlds
[Jacquette]
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9457
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The two main views in philosophy of logic are extensionalism and intensionalism
[Jacquette]
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9461
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Intensionalists say meaning is determined by the possession of properties
[Jacquette]
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9458
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Extensionalists say that quantifiers presuppose the existence of their objects
[Jacquette]
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9460
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Extensionalist semantics forbids reference to nonexistent objects
[Jacquette]
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9459
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Extensionalist semantics is circular, as we must know the extension before assessing 'Fa'
[Jacquette]
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9463
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Classical logic is bivalent, has excluded middle, and only quantifies over existent objects
[Jacquette]
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9465
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Substitutional universal quantification retains truth for substitution of terms of the same type
[Jacquette]
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9466
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Nominalists like substitutional quantification to avoid the metaphysics of objects
[Jacquette]
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7678
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Ontology must include the minimum requirements for our semantics
[Jacquette]
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7679
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Ontology is the same as the conceptual foundations of logic
[Jacquette]
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7685
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An object is a predication subject, distinguished by a distinctive combination of properties
[Jacquette]
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7691
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The actual world is a consistent combination of states, made of consistent property combinations
[Jacquette]
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7688
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The actual world is a maximally consistent combination of actual states of affairs
[Jacquette]
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7695
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Do proposition-structures not associated with the actual world deserve to be called worlds?
[Jacquette]
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7692
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Being is maximal consistency
[Jacquette]
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7683
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Logic is based either on separate objects and properties, or objects as combinations of properties
[Jacquette]
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7684
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Reduce states-of-affairs to object-property combinations, and possible worlds to states-of-affairs
[Jacquette]
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7687
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Existence is completeness and consistency
[Jacquette]
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7682
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Logic is not just about signs, because it relates to states of affairs, objects, properties and truth-values
[Jacquette]
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7681
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Logic describes inferences between sentences expressing possible properties of objects
[Jacquette]
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7689
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The modal logic of C.I.Lewis was only interpreted by Kripke and Hintikka in the 1960s
[Jacquette]
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7697
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On Russell's analysis, the sentence "The winged horse has wings" comes out as false
[Jacquette]
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7701
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Can a Barber shave all and only those persons who do not shave themselves?
[Jacquette]
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7703
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If classes can't be eliminated, and they are property combinations, then properties (universals) can't be either
[Jacquette]
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7702
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The extreme views on propositions are Frege's Platonism and Quine's extreme nominalism
[Jacquette]
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7694
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We must experience the 'actual' world, which is defined by maximally consistent propositions
[Jacquette]
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7699
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Numbers, sets and propositions are abstract particulars; properties, qualities and relations are universals
[Jacquette]
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7706
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If qualia supervene on intentional states, then intentional states are explanatorily fundamental
[Jacquette]
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7704
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Reduction of intentionality involving nonexistent objects is impossible, as reduction must be to what is actual
[Jacquette]
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7707
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To grasp being, we must say why something exists, and why there is one world
[Jacquette]
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