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Single Idea 7693

[filed under theme 10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation ]

Full Idea

Objects we find in the actual world might have been so different than they actually are that it appears impossible to identify the same objects from world to world. Kripke sidesteps the problem by saying transworld identity is a decision, not a discovery.

Gist of Idea

Kripke avoids difficulties of transworld identity by saying it is a decision, not a discovery

Source

report of Saul A. Kripke (Naming and Necessity lectures [1970]) by Dale Jacquette - Ontology Ch.2

Book Ref

Jacquette,Dale: 'Ontology' [Acumen 2002], p.77


A Reaction

This is the strategy that opposes Lewis's proposal of 'counterpart' objects that have properties in common. It is also the source of Kripke's causal theory of reference, and hence a key to massive modern debates.


The 22 ideas with the same theme [items with fixed identity in all possible worlds]:

A rigid designator (for all possible worlds) picks out an object by its essential traits [Quine]
In possible worlds, names are just neutral unvarying pegs for truths and predicates [Marcus (Barcan)]
A 'rigid designator' designates the same object in all possible worlds [Kripke]
We cannot say that Nixon might have been a different man from the one he actually was [Kripke]
Test for rigidity by inserting into the sentence 'N might not have been N' [Kripke, by Lycan]
Kripke avoids difficulties of transworld identity by saying it is a decision, not a discovery [Kripke, by Jacquette]
Saying that natural kinds are 'rigid designators' is the same as saying they are 'indexical' [Kripke, by Putnam]
If Kripke names must still denote a thing in a non-actual situation, the statue isn't its clay [Gibbard on Kripke]
A rigid expression may refer at a world to an object not existing in that world [Kripke, by Sainsbury]
We do not begin with possible worlds and place objects in them; we begin with objects in the real world [Kripke]
It is a necessary truth that Elizabeth II was the child of two particular parents [Kripke]
Kaplan's 'Dthat' is a useful operator for transforming a description into a rigid designation [Kripke]
Possibilities for an individual can only refer to that individual, in some possible world [Plantinga, by Mackie,P]
Rigid designators can be meaningful even if empty [Evans, by Mackie,P]
Identity across possible worlds is prior to rigid designation [Brody]
Rigid designation seems to presuppose that differing worlds contain the same individuals [Stalnaker]
Kripke's semantics needs lots of intuitions about which properties are essential [Gibbard]
It doesn't take the whole of a possible Humphrey to win the election [Lewis]
A logically determinate name names the same thing in every possible world [Lewis]
Rigid designation has at least three essentialist presuppositions [Oderberg]
A thing doesn't need transworld identity prior to rigid reference - that could be a convention of the reference [Sidelle]
'Dthat' operates to make a singular term into a rigid term [Sidelle]