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Single Idea 7697
[filed under theme 5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
]
Full Idea
It is infamous that on Russell's analysis the sentences "The winged horse has wings" and "The winged horse is a horse" are false, because in the extant domain of actual existent entities there contingently exist no winged horses
Gist of Idea
On Russell's analysis, the sentence "The winged horse has wings" comes out as false
Source
Dale Jacquette (Ontology [2002], Ch. 6)
Book Ref
Jacquette,Dale: 'Ontology' [Acumen 2002], p.163
A Reaction
This is the best objection I have heard to Russell's account of definite descriptions. The connected question is whether 'quantifies over' is really a commitment to existence. See Idea 6067.
Related Idea
Idea 6067
Existential quantifiers just express the quantity of things, leaving existence to the predicate 'exists' [McGinn]
The
31 ideas
from Dale Jacquette
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9456
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Modal logic is multiple systems, shown in the variety of accessibility relations between worlds
[Jacquette]
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9457
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The two main views in philosophy of logic are extensionalism and intensionalism
[Jacquette]
|
|
9461
|
Intensionalists say meaning is determined by the possession of properties
[Jacquette]
|
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9458
|
Extensionalists say that quantifiers presuppose the existence of their objects
[Jacquette]
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9460
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Extensionalist semantics forbids reference to nonexistent objects
[Jacquette]
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9459
|
Extensionalist semantics is circular, as we must know the extension before assessing 'Fa'
[Jacquette]
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9463
|
Classical logic is bivalent, has excluded middle, and only quantifies over existent objects
[Jacquette]
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9465
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Substitutional universal quantification retains truth for substitution of terms of the same type
[Jacquette]
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9466
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Nominalists like substitutional quantification to avoid the metaphysics of objects
[Jacquette]
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7678
|
Ontology must include the minimum requirements for our semantics
[Jacquette]
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7679
|
Ontology is the same as the conceptual foundations of logic
[Jacquette]
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7685
|
An object is a predication subject, distinguished by a distinctive combination of properties
[Jacquette]
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|
7691
|
The actual world is a consistent combination of states, made of consistent property combinations
[Jacquette]
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7688
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The actual world is a maximally consistent combination of actual states of affairs
[Jacquette]
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7695
|
Do proposition-structures not associated with the actual world deserve to be called worlds?
[Jacquette]
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7692
|
Being is maximal consistency
[Jacquette]
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7683
|
Logic is based either on separate objects and properties, or objects as combinations of properties
[Jacquette]
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7684
|
Reduce states-of-affairs to object-property combinations, and possible worlds to states-of-affairs
[Jacquette]
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|
7687
|
Existence is completeness and consistency
[Jacquette]
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7682
|
Logic is not just about signs, because it relates to states of affairs, objects, properties and truth-values
[Jacquette]
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7681
|
Logic describes inferences between sentences expressing possible properties of objects
[Jacquette]
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7689
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The modal logic of C.I.Lewis was only interpreted by Kripke and Hintikka in the 1960s
[Jacquette]
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7697
|
On Russell's analysis, the sentence "The winged horse has wings" comes out as false
[Jacquette]
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7701
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Can a Barber shave all and only those persons who do not shave themselves?
[Jacquette]
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7703
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If classes can't be eliminated, and they are property combinations, then properties (universals) can't be either
[Jacquette]
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7702
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The extreme views on propositions are Frege's Platonism and Quine's extreme nominalism
[Jacquette]
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7694
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We must experience the 'actual' world, which is defined by maximally consistent propositions
[Jacquette]
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7699
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Numbers, sets and propositions are abstract particulars; properties, qualities and relations are universals
[Jacquette]
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7706
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If qualia supervene on intentional states, then intentional states are explanatorily fundamental
[Jacquette]
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7704
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Reduction of intentionality involving nonexistent objects is impossible, as reduction must be to what is actual
[Jacquette]
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7707
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To grasp being, we must say why something exists, and why there is one world
[Jacquette]
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