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Full Idea
Putnam's Twin Earth thought experiment suggests that two thinkers can have identical qualia, despite intending different objects on Earth and Twin Earth, and hence that qualia and intentionality must be logically independent of one another.
Gist of Idea
The Twin Earth theory suggests that intentionality is independent of qualia
Source
comment on Hilary Putnam (The Meaning of 'Meaning' [1975]) by Dale Jacquette - Ontology Ch.10
Book Ref
Jacquette,Dale: 'Ontology' [Acumen 2002], p.247
A Reaction
[See Idea 4099, Idea 3208, Idea 7612 for Twin Earth]. Presumably my thought of 'the smallest prime number above 10000' would be a bit thin on qualia too. Does that make them 'logically' independent? Depends what we reduce qualia or intentionality to.
Related Ideas
Idea 4099 If Twins talking about 'water' and 'XYZ' have different thoughts but identical heads, then thoughts aren't in the head [Putnam, by Crane]
Idea 3208 Does 'water' mean a particular substance that was 'dubbed'? [Putnam, by Rey]
Idea 7612 Reference is social not individual, because we defer to experts when referring to elm trees [Putnam]
| 3225 | Mental unity suggests that qualia and intentionality must connect [Brentano, by Rey] |
| 7439 | The qualities involved in sensations are entirely intentional [Anscombe, by Armstrong] |
| 7705 | The Twin Earth theory suggests that intentionality is independent of qualia [Jacquette on Putnam] |
| 4088 | Pain is not intentional, because it does not represent anything beyond itself [Searle] |
| 8130 | Qualities of experience are just representational aspects of experience ('Representationalism') [Harman, by Burge] |
| 3366 | Pain has no reference or content [Kim] |
| 6172 | The Inverted Earth example shows that phenomenal properties are not representational [Block, by Rowlands] |
| 3224 | If qualia have no function, their attachment to thoughts is accidental [Rey] |
| 3227 | Are qualia a type of propositional attitude? [Rey] |
| 4089 | Pains have a region of the body as their intentional content, not some pain object [Crane] |
| 2532 | Intentionality isn't reducible, because of its experiential aspect [Sturgeon] |
| 7272 | Maybe lots of qualia lead to intentionality, rather than intentionality being basic [Gildersleve] |