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Single Idea 7707

[filed under theme 7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being ]

Full Idea

We grasp the concept of being only when we have satisfactorily answered the question why there is something rather than nothing and why there is only one logically contingent actual world.

Gist of Idea

To grasp being, we must say why something exists, and why there is one world

Source

Dale Jacquette (Ontology [2002], Conclusion)

Book Ref

Jacquette,Dale: 'Ontology' [Acumen 2002], p.280

A Reaction

See Ideas 7688 and 7692 for a glimpse of Jacquette's answer. Personally I don't yet have a full grasp of the concept of being, but I'm sure I'll get there if I only work a bit harder.

Related Ideas

Idea 7688 The actual world is a maximally consistent combination of actual states of affairs [Jacquette]

Idea 7692 Being is maximal consistency [Jacquette]

The 31 ideas from Dale Jacquette

9456 Modal logic is multiple systems, shown in the variety of accessibility relations between worlds [Jacquette]
9457 The two main views in philosophy of logic are extensionalism and intensionalism [Jacquette]
9461 Intensionalists say meaning is determined by the possession of properties [Jacquette]
9458 Extensionalists say that quantifiers presuppose the existence of their objects [Jacquette]
9460 Extensionalist semantics forbids reference to nonexistent objects [Jacquette]
9459 Extensionalist semantics is circular, as we must know the extension before assessing 'Fa' [Jacquette]
9463 Classical logic is bivalent, has excluded middle, and only quantifies over existent objects [Jacquette]
9465 Substitutional universal quantification retains truth for substitution of terms of the same type [Jacquette]
9466 Nominalists like substitutional quantification to avoid the metaphysics of objects [Jacquette]
7678 Ontology must include the minimum requirements for our semantics [Jacquette]
7679 Ontology is the same as the conceptual foundations of logic [Jacquette]
7685 An object is a predication subject, distinguished by a distinctive combination of properties [Jacquette]
7691 The actual world is a consistent combination of states, made of consistent property combinations [Jacquette]
7688 The actual world is a maximally consistent combination of actual states of affairs [Jacquette]
7695 Do proposition-structures not associated with the actual world deserve to be called worlds? [Jacquette]
7692 Being is maximal consistency [Jacquette]
7683 Logic is based either on separate objects and properties, or objects as combinations of properties [Jacquette]
7684 Reduce states-of-affairs to object-property combinations, and possible worlds to states-of-affairs [Jacquette]
7687 Existence is completeness and consistency [Jacquette]
7682 Logic is not just about signs, because it relates to states of affairs, objects, properties and truth-values [Jacquette]
7681 Logic describes inferences between sentences expressing possible properties of objects [Jacquette]
7689 The modal logic of C.I.Lewis was only interpreted by Kripke and Hintikka in the 1960s [Jacquette]
7697 On Russell's analysis, the sentence "The winged horse has wings" comes out as false [Jacquette]
7701 Can a Barber shave all and only those persons who do not shave themselves? [Jacquette]
7703 If classes can't be eliminated, and they are property combinations, then properties (universals) can't be either [Jacquette]
7702 The extreme views on propositions are Frege's Platonism and Quine's extreme nominalism [Jacquette]
7694 We must experience the 'actual' world, which is defined by maximally consistent propositions [Jacquette]
7699 Numbers, sets and propositions are abstract particulars; properties, qualities and relations are universals [Jacquette]
7706 If qualia supervene on intentional states, then intentional states are explanatorily fundamental [Jacquette]
7704 Reduction of intentionality involving nonexistent objects is impossible, as reduction must be to what is actual [Jacquette]
7707 To grasp being, we must say why something exists, and why there is one world [Jacquette]