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Single Idea 7707
[filed under theme 7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
]
Full Idea
We grasp the concept of being only when we have satisfactorily answered the question why there is something rather than nothing and why there is only one logically contingent actual world.
Gist of Idea
To grasp being, we must say why something exists, and why there is one world
Source
Dale Jacquette (Ontology [2002], Conclusion)
Book Ref
Jacquette,Dale: 'Ontology' [Acumen 2002], p.280
A Reaction
See Ideas 7688 and 7692 for a glimpse of Jacquette's answer. Personally I don't yet have a full grasp of the concept of being, but I'm sure I'll get there if I only work a bit harder.
Related Ideas
Idea 7688
The actual world is a maximally consistent combination of actual states of affairs [Jacquette]
Idea 7692
Being is maximal consistency [Jacquette]
The
22 ideas
from 'Ontology'
7679
|
Ontology is the same as the conceptual foundations of logic
[Jacquette]
|
7678
|
Ontology must include the minimum requirements for our semantics
[Jacquette]
|
7683
|
Logic is based either on separate objects and properties, or objects as combinations of properties
[Jacquette]
|
7684
|
Reduce states-of-affairs to object-property combinations, and possible worlds to states-of-affairs
[Jacquette]
|
7691
|
The actual world is a consistent combination of states, made of consistent property combinations
[Jacquette]
|
7688
|
The actual world is a maximally consistent combination of actual states of affairs
[Jacquette]
|
7695
|
Do proposition-structures not associated with the actual world deserve to be called worlds?
[Jacquette]
|
7687
|
Existence is completeness and consistency
[Jacquette]
|
7692
|
Being is maximal consistency
[Jacquette]
|
7689
|
The modal logic of C.I.Lewis was only interpreted by Kripke and Hintikka in the 1960s
[Jacquette]
|
7681
|
Logic describes inferences between sentences expressing possible properties of objects
[Jacquette]
|
7682
|
Logic is not just about signs, because it relates to states of affairs, objects, properties and truth-values
[Jacquette]
|
7685
|
An object is a predication subject, distinguished by a distinctive combination of properties
[Jacquette]
|
7697
|
On Russell's analysis, the sentence "The winged horse has wings" comes out as false
[Jacquette]
|
7701
|
Can a Barber shave all and only those persons who do not shave themselves?
[Jacquette]
|
7694
|
We must experience the 'actual' world, which is defined by maximally consistent propositions
[Jacquette]
|
7703
|
If classes can't be eliminated, and they are property combinations, then properties (universals) can't be either
[Jacquette]
|
7699
|
Numbers, sets and propositions are abstract particulars; properties, qualities and relations are universals
[Jacquette]
|
7702
|
The extreme views on propositions are Frege's Platonism and Quine's extreme nominalism
[Jacquette]
|
7706
|
If qualia supervene on intentional states, then intentional states are explanatorily fundamental
[Jacquette]
|
7704
|
Reduction of intentionality involving nonexistent objects is impossible, as reduction must be to what is actual
[Jacquette]
|
7707
|
To grasp being, we must say why something exists, and why there is one world
[Jacquette]
|