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Single Idea 7718
[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
]
Full Idea
General and universal belong, not to the real existence of things, but are the inventions and creatures of the understanding, made by it for its own use, and concern only signs, whether words, or ideas.
Gist of Idea
Universals do not exist, but are useful inventions of the mind, involving words or ideas
Source
John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], III.3.11)
Book Ref
Locke,John: 'Essay Concerning Human Understanding', ed/tr. Nidditch,P.H. [OUP 1979], p.414
A Reaction
This places Locke as a thoroughgoing nominalist. However, while the most basic question of all is said to be 'why does anything exist?', another pretty good one is 'Why do things resemble one another?'. Maybe the universal had to come first?
The
16 ideas
with the same theme
[denial of the real existence of universals]:
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5869
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The thesis of the Form of the Good (or of anything else) is verbal and vacuous
[Aristotle]
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10396
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If 'animal' is wholly present in Socrates and an ass, then 'animal' is rational and irrational
[Abelard, by King,P]
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10395
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Abelard was an irrealist about virtually everything apart from concrete individuals
[Abelard, by King,P]
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9103
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A universal is not a real feature of objects, but only a thought-object in the mind
[William of Ockham]
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15388
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Universals are single things, and only universal in what they signify
[William of Ockham]
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17247
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The only generalities or universals are names or signs
[Hobbes]
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7717
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All things that exist are particulars
[Locke]
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7718
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Universals do not exist, but are useful inventions of the mind, involving words or ideas
[Locke]
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6715
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Universals do not have single meaning, but attach to many different particulars
[Berkeley]
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6719
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No one will think of abstractions if they only have particular ideas
[Berkeley]
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23650
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Only individuals exist
[Reid]
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9006
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Commitment to universals is as arbitrary or pragmatic as the adoption of a new system of bookkeeping
[Quine]
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15402
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There is no entity called 'redness', and that some things are red is ultimate and irreducible
[Quine]
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8576
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The One over Many problem (in predication terms) deserves to be neglected (by ostriches)
[Lewis]
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8503
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The particular/universal distinction is unhelpful clutter; we should accept 'a is F' as basic
[Devitt]
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4232
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Nominalists believe that only particulars exist
[Lowe]
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