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Single Idea 7720

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism ]

Full Idea

A problem for resemblance nominalism is that in saying that two particulars 'resemble' one another, it is necessary to specify in what respect they do so (e.g. colour, shape, size), and this threatens to reintroduce what appears to be talk of universals.

Gist of Idea

Two things can only resemble one another in some respect, and that may reintroduce a universal

Source

E.J. Lowe (Locke on Human Understanding [1995], Ch.7)

Book Ref

Lowe,E.J.: 'Locke on Human Understanding' [Routledge 2004], p.163

A Reaction

We see resemblance between faces instantly, long before we can specify the 'respects' of the resemblance. This supports the Humean hard-wired view of resemblance, rather than some appeal to Platonic universals.

The 23 ideas with the same theme [universals are groups of resembling particulars]:

5015 A universal is a single idea applied to individual things that are similar to one another [Descartes]
6714 Universals do not have any intrinsic properties, but only relations to particulars [Berkeley]
11098 Momentary impressions are wrongly identified with one another on the basis of resemblance [Hume, by Quine]
7954 If we see a resemblance among objects, we apply the same name to them, despite their differences [Hume]
23649 No one thinks two sheets possess a single whiteness, but all agree they are both white [Reid]
4441 'Resemblance Nominalism' won't work, because the theory treats resemblance itself as a universal [Russell]
7956 If all and only red things were round things, we would need to specify the 'respect' of the resemblance [Goodman, by Macdonald,C]
7957 Without respects of resemblance, we would collect blue book, blue pen, red pen, red clock together [Goodman, by Macdonald,C]
8532 Resemblances must be in certain 'respects', and they seem awfully like properties [Armstrong]
4439 'Resemblance Nominalism' says properties are resemblances between classes of particulars [Armstrong]
4440 'Resemblance Nominalism' finds that in practice the construction of resemblance classes is hard [Armstrong]
8500 Colour resemblance isn't just resemblance between things; 'colour' must be mentioned [Jackson]
8521 Nominalism has the problem that without humans nothing would resemble anything else [Campbell,K]
7009 Similarity among modes will explain everthing universals were for [Heil]
7041 Similar objects have similar properties; properties are directly similar [Heil]
7720 Two things can only resemble one another in some respect, and that may reintroduce a universal [Lowe]
9447 If properties are clusters of powers, this can explain why properties resemble in degrees [Mumford]
4458 Unlike Class Nominalism, Resemblance Nominalism can distinguish natural from unnatural classes [Moreland]
9472 Resemblance itself needs explanation, presumably in terms of something held in common [Bird]
7955 Resemblance Nominalism cannot explain either new resemblances, or absence of resemblances [Macdonald,C]
18435 Resemblance Nominalists say that resemblance explains properties (not the other way round) [Rodriquez-Pereyra]
18436 Entities are truthmakers for their resemblances, so no extra entities or 'resemblances' are needed [Rodriquez-Pereyra]
18437 Resemblance nominalism requires a second entity to explain 'the rose is crimson' [Edwards]