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Single Idea 7736

[filed under theme 18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts ]

Full Idea

A concept is a one-place function - something that can be asserted of an object - as found in 'Earth is a planet' and 'Venus is a planet'. This notion of concept does not belong to psychology at all.

Gist of Idea

A concept is a non-psychological one-place function asserting something of an object

Source

report of Gottlob Frege (Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) [1884]) by Joan Weiner - Frege Ch.4

Book Ref

Weiner,Joan: 'Frege' [OUP 1999], p.57

A Reaction

This doesn't seem to leave room for the concept of the object or substance of which the something is asserted. In 'x is a planet' we need a concept of what x is. But then Frege will reduce the reference to a set of descriptions (i.e. functions).

The 20 ideas with the same theme [concepts as meanings, distinct from a word's reference]:

9839 Frege equated the concepts under which an object falls with its properties [Frege, by Dummett]
9947 Concepts are the ontological counterparts of predicative expressions [Frege, by George/Velleman]
10319 An assertion about the concept 'horse' must indirectly speak of an object [Frege, by Hale]
8488 A concept is a function whose value is always a truth-value [Frege]
9190 A concept is a function mapping objects onto truth-values, if they fall under the concept [Frege, by Dummett]
13665 Frege took the study of concepts to be part of logic [Frege, by Shapiro]
13878 Concepts are, precisely, the references of predicates [Frege, by Wright,C]
7736 A concept is a non-psychological one-place function asserting something of an object [Frege, by Weiner]
17430 Fregean concepts have precise boundaries and universal applicability [Frege, by Koslicki]
8622 Psychological accounts of concepts are subjective, and ultimately destroy truth [Frege]
18752 'The concept "horse"' denotes a concept, yet seems also to denote an object [Frege, by McGee]
19168 Concepts only have a 'functional character', because they map to truth values, not objects [Dummett, by Davidson]
11836 We can use 'concept' for the reference, and 'conception' for sense [Wiggins]
12637 Frege's puzzles suggest to many that concepts have sense as well as reference [Fodor]
12638 If concepts have sense, we can't see the connection to their causal powers [Fodor]
12639 Belief in 'senses' may explain intentionality, but not mental processes [Fodor]
12605 A sense is individuated by the conditions for reference [Peacocke]
12607 Fregean concepts have their essence fixed by reference-conditions [Peacocke]
13475 The Fregean concept of GREEN is a function assigning true to green things, and false to the rest [Hart,WD]
22290 The phrase 'the concept "horse"' can't refer to a concept, because it is saturated [Potter]