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Single Idea 7745

[filed under theme 5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive ]

Full Idea

Russell's proposal that a natural name is an abbreviated description invites four objections: not all speakers can produce descriptions; the description could be false; no one description seems special; and descriptions usually contain names.

Gist of Idea

Are names descriptions, if the description is unknown, false, not special, or contains names?

Source

comment on Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Gregory McCullogh - The Game of the Name 8.74

Book Ref

McCulloch,Gregory: 'The Game of the Name' [OUP 1989], p.268

A Reaction

The best reply on behalf of Russell is probably to concede all of these points, but deny that any of them are fatal. Most replies will probably say that they are possible true descriptions, rather than actual limited, confused or false ones.

The 33 ideas with the same theme [names imply information about the object]:

14075 Proper name in modal contexts refer obliquely, to their usual sense [Frege, by Gibbard]
10424 A Fregean proper name has a sense determining an object, instead of a concept [Frege, by Sainsbury]
18773 People may have different senses for 'Aristotle', like 'pupil of Plato' or 'teacher of Alexander' [Frege]
8448 Any object can have many different names, each with a distinct sense [Frege]
10999 Names need a means of reidentifying their referents [Bradley, by Read]
10450 Russell admitted that even names could also be used as descriptions [Russell, by Bach]
14457 Names are really descriptions, except for a few words like 'this' and 'that' [Russell]
14458 Asking 'Did Homer exist?' is employing an abbreviated description [Russell]
18941 Names don't have a sense, but are disguised definite descriptions [Russell, by Sawyer]
4945 Russell says names are not denotations, but definite descriptions in disguise [Russell, by Kripke]
18942 Russell says a name contributes a complex of properties, rather than an object [Russell, by Sawyer]
7745 Are names descriptions, if the description is unknown, false, not special, or contains names? [McCullogh on Russell]
7744 Treat description using quantifiers, and treat proper names as descriptions [Russell, by McCullogh]
5386 Proper names are really descriptions, and can be replaced by a description in a person's mind [Russell]
4946 A name is not determined by a description, but by a cluster or family [Wittgenstein, by Kripke]
10925 Failure of substitutivity shows that a personal name is not purely referential [Quine]
9182 Ancient names like 'Obadiah' depend on tradition, not on where the name originated [Dummett]
21878 Names have a subjective aspect, especially the role of our own name [Derrida]
21889 'I' is the perfect name, because it denotes without description [Derrida]
9175 We may fix the reference of 'Cicero' by a description, but thereafter the name is rigid [Kripke]
4951 A bundle of qualities is a collection of abstractions, so it can't be a particular [Kripke]
17031 A name can still refer even if it satisfies none of its well-known descriptions [Kripke]
7746 We don't normally think of names as having senses (e.g. we don't give definitions of them) [Searle]
7747 How can a proper name be correlated with its object if it hasn't got a sense? [Searle]
7748 'Aristotle' means more than just 'an object that was christened "Aristotle"' [Searle]
7749 Reference for proper names presupposes a set of uniquely referring descriptions [Searle]
7750 Proper names are logically connected with their characteristics, in a loose way [Searle]
5829 We refer to Thales successfully by name, even if all descriptions of him are false [Schwartz,SP]
5830 The traditional theory of names says some of the descriptions must be correct [Schwartz,SP]
10452 Proper names can be non-referential - even predicate as well as attributive uses [Bach]
15599 Cicero/Cicero and Cicero/Tully may differ in relationship, despite being semantically the same [Fine,K]
16216 Part of the sense of a proper name is a criterion of the thing's identity [Hawley]
9455 Maybe proper names have the content of fixing a thing's category [Bealer]