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Single Idea 7750

[filed under theme 5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive ]

Full Idea

If asked whether or not proper names are logically connected with characteristics of the object to which they refer, the answer is 'yes, in a loose sort of way'.

Gist of Idea

Proper names are logically connected with their characteristics, in a loose way

Source

John Searle (Proper Names [1958], p.96)

Book Ref

'Philosophical Logic', ed/tr. Strawson,P.F. [OUP 1973], p.96


A Reaction

It seems to be inviting trouble to assert that a connection is both 'logical' and 'loose'. Clearly Searle has been reading too much later Wittgenstein. This is probably the weakest point in Searle's proposal, which brought a landslide of criticism.


The 5 ideas from 'Proper Names'

We don't normally think of names as having senses (e.g. we don't give definitions of them) [Searle]
How can a proper name be correlated with its object if it hasn't got a sense? [Searle]
'Aristotle' means more than just 'an object that was christened "Aristotle"' [Searle]
Reference for proper names presupposes a set of uniquely referring descriptions [Searle]
Proper names are logically connected with their characteristics, in a loose way [Searle]