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Single Idea 7756

[filed under theme 9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects ]

Full Idea

Meinong insisted (à la Anselm) that any possible object of thought - even a self-contradictory one - has being of a sort even though only a few such things are so lucky as to exist in reality as well.

Gist of Idea

Meinong said all objects of thought (even self-contradictions) have some sort of being

Source

report of Alexius Meinong (The Theory of Objects [1904]) by William Lycan - Philosophy of Language Ch.1

Book Ref

Lycan,William G.: 'Philosophy of Language' [Routledge 2000], p.14

A Reaction

['This idea gave Russell fits' says Lycan]. In the English-speaking world this is virtually the only idea for which Meinong is remembered. Russell (Idea 5409) was happy for some things to merely 'subsist' as well as others which could 'exist'.

Related Idea

Idea 5409 Normal existence is in time, so we must say that universals 'subsist' [Russell]

The 17 ideas with the same theme [status of 'objects' that can't actually exist]:

10945 Some philosophers say that in some qualified way non-existent things 'are' [Aristotle]
7756 Meinong said all objects of thought (even self-contradictions) have some sort of being [Meinong, by Lycan]
15781 The objects of knowledge are far more numerous than objects which exist [Meinong]
21531 Common sense agrees with Meinong (rather than Russell) that 'Pegasus is a flying horse' is true [Lackey on Russell]
21545 I prefer to deny round squares, and deal with the difficulties by the theory of denoting [Russell]
21547 On Meinong's principles 'the existent round square' has to exist [Russell]
18777 If the King of France is not bald, and not not-bald, this violates excluded middle [Linsky,B on Russell]
15783 Definite descriptions can't unambiguously pick out an object which doesn't exist [Lycan on Quine]
16435 Plantinga proposes necessary existent essences as surrogates for the nonexistent things [Plantinga, by Stalnaker]
18948 There is an object for every set of properties (some of which exist, and others don't) [Parsons,T, by Sawyer]
14617 Predicates can't apply to what doesn't exist [Stalnaker]
15792 Maybe non-existent objects are sets of properties [Lycan]
18852 A Meinongian principle might say that there is an object for any modest class of properties [Rosen]
14392 Fregeans say 'hobbits do not exist' is just 'being a hobbit' is not exemplified [Merricks]
12448 Things that don't exist don't have any properties [Azzouni]
18766 's is non-existent' cannot be said if 's' does not designate [Anderson,CA]
18768 We cannot pick out a thing and deny its existence, but we can say a concept doesn't correspond [Anderson,CA]