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Single Idea 7756

[filed under theme 9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects ]

Full Idea

Meinong insisted (à la Anselm) that any possible object of thought - even a self-contradictory one - has being of a sort even though only a few such things are so lucky as to exist in reality as well.

Gist of Idea

Meinong said all objects of thought (even self-contradictions) have some sort of being

Source

report of Alexius Meinong (The Theory of Objects [1904]) by William Lycan - Philosophy of Language Ch.1

Book Ref

Lycan,William G.: 'Philosophy of Language' [Routledge 2000], p.14


A Reaction

['This idea gave Russell fits' says Lycan]. In the English-speaking world this is virtually the only idea for which Meinong is remembered. Russell (Idea 5409) was happy for some things to merely 'subsist' as well as others which could 'exist'.

Related Idea

Idea 5409 Normal existence is in time, so we must say that universals 'subsist' [Russell]


The 6 ideas from 'The Theory of Objects'

So-called 'free logic' operates without existence assumptions [Meinong, by George/Van Evra]
There can be impossible and contradictory objects, if they can have properties [Meinong, by Friend]
There are objects of which it is true that there are no such objects [Meinong]
Meinong says an object need not exist, but must only have properties [Meinong, by Friend]
Meinong said all objects of thought (even self-contradictions) have some sort of being [Meinong, by Lycan]
The objects of knowledge are far more numerous than objects which exist [Meinong]