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Single Idea 7762

[filed under theme 5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential ]

Full Idea

Mill seemed to defend the view that proper names are merely labels for individual persons or objects, and contribute no more than those individuals themselves to the meanings of sentences in which they occur.

Gist of Idea

Proper names are just labels for persons or objects, and the meaning is the object

Source

report of John Stuart Mill (System of Logic [1843]) by William Lycan - Philosophy of Language

Book Ref

Lycan,William G.: 'Philosophy of Language' [Routledge 2000], p.37

A Reaction

Identity statements can become trivial on this view ('Twain is Clemens'). Modern views have become more sympathetic to Mill, since externalism places meanings outside the head of the speaker.

The 22 ideas with the same theme [names do no more than pick out an object]:

13789 Anyone who knows a thing's name also knows the thing [Plato]
4944 Mill says names have denotation but not connotation [Mill, by Kripke]
7762 Proper names are just labels for persons or objects, and the meaning is the object [Mill, by Lycan]
4978 The meaning of a proper name is the designated object [Frege]
6410 The only real proper names are 'this' and 'that'; the rest are really definite descriptions. [Russell, by Grayling]
10449 Logically proper names introduce objects; definite descriptions introduce quantifications [Russell, by Bach]
15159 The meaning of a logically proper name is its referent, but most names are not logically proper [Russell, by Soames]
10823 A name denotes an object if the object satisfies a particular sentential function [Tarski]
7089 A name is primitive, and its meaning is the object [Wittgenstein]
21879 Even Kripke can't explain names; the word is the thing, and the thing is the word [Derrida]
9171 The function of names is simply to refer [Kripke]
10428 Proper names must have referents, because they are not descriptive [Kripke, by Sainsbury]
8957 Some references, such as 'Neptune', have to be fixed by description rather than baptism [Kripke, by Szabó]
4959 A name's reference is not fixed by any marks or properties of the referent [Kripke]
16982 A man has two names if the historical chains are different - even if they are the same! [Kripke]
9041 The Causal Theory of Names is wrong, since the name 'Madagascar' actually changed denotation [Evans]
16405 To understand a name (unlike a description) picking the thing out is sufficient? [Stalnaker]
10456 Millian names struggle with existence, empty names, identities and attitude ascription [Bach]
13399 Examples show that ordinary proper names are not rigid designators [Jubien]
7306 If the only property of a name was its reference, we couldn't explain bearerless names [Miller,A]
21653 Maybe not even names are referential, but are just by used by speakers to refer [Hofweber]
18945 Millians say a name just means its object [Sawyer]