more on this theme | more from this thinker
Full Idea
The truth conditions theory sees meaning as representation.
Gist of Idea
The truth conditions theory sees meaning as representation
Source
William Lycan (Philosophy of Language [2000], Ch. 9)
Book Ref
Lycan,William G.: 'Philosophy of Language' [Routledge 2000], p.136
A Reaction
This suggests a nice connection to Fodor's account of intentional thinking. The whole package sounds right to me (though the representations need not be 'symbolic', or in mentalese).
| 7755 | Singular terms refer, using proper names, definite descriptions, singular personal pronouns, demonstratives, etc. [Lycan] |
| 7763 | It is hard to state a rule of use for a proper name [Lycan] |
| 7764 | Could I successfully use an expression, without actually understanding it? [Lycan] |
| 7766 | Meaning must be known before we can consider verification [Lycan] |
| 7768 | The truth conditions theory sees meaning as representation [Lycan] |
| 7770 | Truth conditions will come out the same for sentences with 'renate' or 'cordate' [Lycan] |
| 7773 | A sentence's truth conditions is the set of possible worlds in which the sentence is true [Lycan] |
| 7774 | Possible worlds explain aspects of meaning neatly - entailment, for example, is the subset relation [Lycan] |