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Single Idea 7779

[filed under theme 14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction ]

Full Idea

According to Popper, induction is a dispensable concept, a myth. It does not exist. There is no such thing.

Gist of Idea

There is no such thing as induction

Source

report of Karl Popper (The Logic of Scientific Discovery [1934]) by Bryan Magee - Popper Ch.2

Book Ref

Magee,Bryan: 'Popper' [Fontana 1974], p.31


A Reaction

This is a nice bold summary of the Popper view - that falsification is the underlying rational activity which we mistakenly think is verification by repeated observations. Put like this, Popper seems to be wrong. We obviously learn from experiences.


The 16 ideas from Karl Popper

Science does not aim at ultimate explanations [Popper]
Galilean science aimed at true essences, as the ultimate explanations [Popper]
Essentialist views of science prevent further questions from being raised [Popper]
Human artefacts may have essences, in their purposes [Popper]
Falsification is the criterion of demarcation between science and non-science [Popper, by Magee]
We don't only reject hypotheses because we have falsified them [Lipton on Popper]
If falsification requires logical inconsistency, then probabilistic statements can't be falsified [Bird on Popper]
When Popper gets in difficulties, he quietly uses induction to help out [Bird on Popper]
Good theories have empirical content, explain a lot, and are not falsified [Popper, by Newton-Smith]
Science cannot be shown to be rational if induction is rejected [Newton-Smith on Popper]
Give Nobel Prizes for really good refutations? [Gorham on Popper]
There is no such thing as induction [Popper, by Magee]
Scientific objectivity lies in inter-subjective testing [Popper]
Popper felt that ancient essentialism was a bar to progress [Popper, by Mautner]
Particulars can be verified or falsified, but general statements can only be falsified (conclusively) [Popper]
Propensities are part of a situation, not part of the objects [Popper]