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Single Idea 7851
[filed under theme 18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
]
Full Idea
Conscious states clearly affect our bodily movements. But surely anything that so produces a material effect must itself be a material state.
Gist of Idea
Consciousness affects bodily movement, so thoughts must be material states
Source
David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], Intro §6)
Book Ref
Papineau,David: 'Thinking about Consciousness' [OUP 2004], p.8
A Reaction
This is Papineau's simplest possible statement of what he calls the Causal Argument, which he considers to be a knock-down argument for materialism. I agree, but it is really only an intuition. You never know...
The
39 ideas
from 'Thinking about Consciousness'
7890
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Maybe a creature is conscious if its mental states represent things in a distinct way
[Papineau]
|
7884
|
Most reductive accounts of representation imply broad content
[Papineau]
|
7850
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Thinking about a thing doesn't require activating it
[Papineau]
|
7853
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Causation is based on either events, or facts, or states of affairs
[Papineau]
|
7852
|
The only serious mind-brain theories now are identity, token identity, realization and supervenience
[Papineau]
|
7851
|
Consciousness affects bodily movement, so thoughts must be material states
[Papineau]
|
7854
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Whether octopuses feel pain is unclear, because our phenomenal concepts are too vague
[Papineau]
|
7856
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It is absurd to think that physical effects are caused twice, so conscious causes must be physical
[Papineau]
|
7857
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Causes are instantiations of properties by particulars, or they are themselves basic particulars
[Papineau]
|
7858
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If causes are basic particulars, this doesn't make conscious and physical properties identical
[Papineau]
|
7860
|
The epiphenomenal relation of mind and brain is a 'causal dangler', unlike anything else
[Papineau]
|
7862
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Maybe minds do not cause actions, but do cause us to report our decisions
[Papineau]
|
7863
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If content hinges on matters outside of you, how can it causally influence your actions?
[Papineau]
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7864
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Maybe mind and body do overdetermine acts, but are linked (for some reason)
[Papineau]
|
7865
|
Supervenience can be replaced by identifying mind with higher-order or disjunctional properties
[Papineau]
|
7866
|
Mary acquires new concepts; she previously thought about the same property using material concepts
[Papineau]
|
7869
|
Truth conditions in possible worlds can't handle statements about impossibilities
[Papineau]
|
7868
|
Thought content is possible worlds that make the thought true; if that includes the actual world, it's true
[Papineau]
|
7870
|
Role concepts either name the realising property, or the higher property constituting the role
[Papineau]
|
7871
|
Perceptual concepts can't just refer to what causes classification
[Papineau]
|
7872
|
Teleosemantics equates meaning with the item the concept is intended to track
[Papineau]
|
7873
|
Young children can see that other individuals sometimes have false beliefs
[Papineau]
|
7874
|
Do we understand other minds by simulation-theory, or by theory-theory?
[Papineau]
|
7879
|
Mind-brain reduction is less explanatory, because phenomenal concepts lack causal roles
[Papineau]
|
7881
|
Accept ontological monism, but conceptual dualism; we think in a different way about phenomenal thought
[Papineau]
|
7882
|
Researching phenomenal consciousness is peculiar, because the concepts involved are peculiar
[Papineau]
|
7883
|
Verificationists tend to infer indefinite answers from undecidable questions
[Papineau]
|
7885
|
The 'actualist' HOT theory says consciousness comes from actual higher judgements of mental states
[Papineau]
|
7886
|
Actualist HOT theories imply that a non-conscious mental event could become conscious when remembered
[Papineau]
|
7887
|
States are conscious if they could be the subject of higher-order mental judgements
[Papineau]
|
7888
|
Higher-order judgements may be possible where the subject denies having been conscious
[Papineau]
|
7889
|
Our concept of consciousness is crude, and lacks theoretical articulation
[Papineau]
|
7891
|
We can’t decide what 'conscious' means, so it is undecidable whether cats are conscious
[Papineau]
|
20974
|
Modern biological research, especially into the cell, has revealed no special new natural forces
[Papineau]
|
20975
|
Quantum 'wave collapses' seem to violate conservation of energy
[Papineau]
|
20970
|
Determinism is possible without a complete physics, if mental forces play a role
[Papineau]
|
20971
|
Weak reduction of mind is to physical causes; strong reduction is also to physical laws
[Papineau]
|
20976
|
The completeness of physics cannot be proved
[Papineau]
|
7892
|
The completeness of physics is needed for mind-brain identity
[Papineau]
|