more from this thinker | more from this text
Full Idea
Anybody writing seriously about mind-brain issues nowadays needs to explain whether they think of materialism in terms of identity, token identity, realization, or supervenience.
Gist of Idea
The only serious mind-brain theories now are identity, token identity, realization and supervenience
Source
David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], Intro §6)
Book Ref
Papineau,David: 'Thinking about Consciousness' [OUP 2004], p.8
A Reaction
Dualists are not invited. Functionalists are attending a different party. I wonder if his four categories collapse into two: the token/supervenience view, and the identity/realization view?
| 2096 | Is the function of the mind management, authority and planning - or is it one's whole way of life? [Plato] |
| 4608 | Minds are hard-wired, or trial-and-error, or experimental, or full self-aware [Dennett, by Heil] |
| 2443 | I say psychology is intentional, semantics is informational, and thinking is computation [Fodor] |
| 2994 | In CRTT thought may be represented, content must be [Fodor] |
| 7852 | The only serious mind-brain theories now are identity, token identity, realization and supervenience [Papineau] |
| 3136 | The three theories are reduction, dualism, eliminativism [Rey] |
| 4610 | Different generations focus on either the quality of mind, or its scientific standing, or the content of thought [Heil] |
| 2537 | Types are properties, and tokens are events. Are they split between mental and physical, or not? [Sturgeon] |
| 2534 | Mindless bodies are zombies, bodiless minds are ghosts [Sturgeon] |
| 6617 | The main questions are: is mind distinct from body, and does it have unique properties? [Lowe] |