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Single Idea 7854

[filed under theme 15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness ]

Full Idea

Our phenomenal concepts are irredeemably vague in certain dimensions, in ways that preclude there being any fact of the matter about whether octopuses feel phenomenal pain, or silicon-based humanoids would have any phenomenal consciousness.

Gist of Idea

Whether octopuses feel pain is unclear, because our phenomenal concepts are too vague

Source

David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], Intro §7)

Book Ref

Papineau,David: 'Thinking about Consciousness' [OUP 2004], p.11

A Reaction

It would be hard for Papineau to prove this point, but clearly our imagination finds it very hard to grasp the idea of a thing which is 'somewhat conscious'. The concept of being much more conscious than humans also bewilders us.

The 21 ideas with the same theme [general ideas about consciousness]:

7995 In all living beings I am the light of consciousness, says Krishna [Anon (Bhag)]
19354 Leibniz introduced the idea of degrees of consciousness, essential for his monads [Leibniz, by Perkins]
23658 Consciousness is an indefinable and unique operation [Reid]
4166 A consciousness without an object is no consciousness [Schopenhauer]
23872 'Society determines consciousness' is contradictory; society only exists in minds [Weil on Marx/Engels]
5277 Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life [Marx/Engels]
19626 Our instincts had to be blunted and diminished, to make way for consciousness! [Cioran]
21941 Unlike Marxists, Foucault explains thought internally, without deference to conscious ideas [Foucault, by Gutting]
5786 A system is either conscious or it isn't, though the intensity varies a lot [Searle]
5794 Consciousness has a first-person ontology, which only exists from a subjective viewpoint [Searle]
5795 There isn't one consciousness (information-processing) which can be investigated, and another (phenomenal) which can't [Searle]
4884 Brain states must be in my head, and yet the pain seems to be in my hand [Perry]
2528 Does consciousness need the concept of consciousness? [Dennett]
7367 Perhaps the brain doesn't 'fill in' gaps in consciousness if no one is looking. [Dennett]
7393 We can't draw a clear line between conscious and unconscious [Dennett]
4880 Sentience comes in grades from robotic to super-human; we only draw a line for moral reasons [Dennett]
7854 Whether octopuses feel pain is unclear, because our phenomenal concepts are too vague [Papineau]
7889 Our concept of consciousness is crude, and lacks theoretical articulation [Papineau]
7891 We can’t decide what 'conscious' means, so it is undecidable whether cats are conscious [Papineau]
4621 Whatever exists has qualities, so it is no surprise that states of minds have qualities [Heil]
6668 If the present does not exist, then consciousness must be memory of the immediate past [Marshall]