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Full Idea
Our phenomenal concepts are irredeemably vague in certain dimensions, in ways that preclude there being any fact of the matter about whether octopuses feel phenomenal pain, or silicon-based humanoids would have any phenomenal consciousness.
Gist of Idea
Whether octopuses feel pain is unclear, because our phenomenal concepts are too vague
Source
David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], Intro §7)
Book Ref
Papineau,David: 'Thinking about Consciousness' [OUP 2004], p.11
A Reaction
It would be hard for Papineau to prove this point, but clearly our imagination finds it very hard to grasp the idea of a thing which is 'somewhat conscious'. The concept of being much more conscious than humans also bewilders us.