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Single Idea 7862

[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism ]

Full Idea

Even if conscious decisions did not contribute causally to the actions normally attributed to them, they would still presumably be the causes of the sounds I make when I later report my earlier conscious decisions.

Gist of Idea

Maybe minds do not cause actions, but do cause us to report our decisions

Source

David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], 1.4)

Book Ref

Papineau,David: 'Thinking about Consciousness' [OUP 2004], p.25


A Reaction

This is a good reply to my view (borrowed from Dennett - Idea 7379), that epiphenomalism proposes an absurdity (an entity with no causal powers). But if mind can cause speech, why could it not cause arm movements?

Related Idea

Idea 7379 If an epiphenomenon has no physical effects, it has to be undetectable [Dennett]


The 13 ideas with the same theme [mind as by-product of matter, having no effect]:

T.H.Huxley gave the earliest clear statement of epiphenomenalism [Huxley, by Rey]
Brain causes mind, but it doesn't seem that mind causes actions [Huxley]
Consciousness is a terminal phenomenon, and causes nothing [Nietzsche]
Epiphenomenalism is like a pointless nobleman, kept for show, but soon to be abolished [Alexander,S]
Epiphenomenalism makes the mind totally pointless [Alexander,S]
If epiphenomenalism were true, we couldn't report consciousness [Kim]
If epiphenomenalism just says mental events are effects but not causes, it is consistent with physicalism [Perry]
If an epiphenomenon has no physical effects, it has to be undetectable [Dennett]
Either intentionality causes things, or epiphenomenalism is true [Fodor]
The epiphenomenal relation of mind and brain is a 'causal dangler', unlike anything else [Papineau]
Maybe minds do not cause actions, but do cause us to report our decisions [Papineau]
Functionalism defines mental states by their causal properties, which rules out epiphenomenalism [Crane]
If qualia are causally inert, how can we even know about them? [Lowe]