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Single Idea 7864
[filed under theme 15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 3. Mental Causation
]
Full Idea
Maybe physical effects of mental causes are always overdetermined by distinct causes (the 'belt and braces' view). Defenders say the two are still counterfactually dependent - but that would raise the question of why, if they are ontologically distinct.
Gist of Idea
Maybe mind and body do overdetermine acts, but are linked (for some reason)
Source
David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], 1.5)
Book Ref
Papineau,David: 'Thinking about Consciousness' [OUP 2004], p.27
A Reaction
[He cites D.H. Mellor as defending 'belt and braces'] This strikes me as the sort of theory that arises from desperation: traditional dualism won't work, but we MUST keep mind separate, so that we can have free will, and save morality. All very confused!
The
39 ideas
from 'Thinking about Consciousness'
7890
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Maybe a creature is conscious if its mental states represent things in a distinct way
[Papineau]
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7884
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Most reductive accounts of representation imply broad content
[Papineau]
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7850
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Thinking about a thing doesn't require activating it
[Papineau]
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7853
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Causation is based on either events, or facts, or states of affairs
[Papineau]
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7852
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The only serious mind-brain theories now are identity, token identity, realization and supervenience
[Papineau]
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7851
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Consciousness affects bodily movement, so thoughts must be material states
[Papineau]
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7854
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Whether octopuses feel pain is unclear, because our phenomenal concepts are too vague
[Papineau]
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7856
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It is absurd to think that physical effects are caused twice, so conscious causes must be physical
[Papineau]
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7857
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Causes are instantiations of properties by particulars, or they are themselves basic particulars
[Papineau]
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7858
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If causes are basic particulars, this doesn't make conscious and physical properties identical
[Papineau]
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7860
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The epiphenomenal relation of mind and brain is a 'causal dangler', unlike anything else
[Papineau]
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7862
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Maybe minds do not cause actions, but do cause us to report our decisions
[Papineau]
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7863
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If content hinges on matters outside of you, how can it causally influence your actions?
[Papineau]
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7864
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Maybe mind and body do overdetermine acts, but are linked (for some reason)
[Papineau]
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7865
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Supervenience can be replaced by identifying mind with higher-order or disjunctional properties
[Papineau]
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7866
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Mary acquires new concepts; she previously thought about the same property using material concepts
[Papineau]
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7869
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Truth conditions in possible worlds can't handle statements about impossibilities
[Papineau]
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7868
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Thought content is possible worlds that make the thought true; if that includes the actual world, it's true
[Papineau]
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7870
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Role concepts either name the realising property, or the higher property constituting the role
[Papineau]
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7871
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Perceptual concepts can't just refer to what causes classification
[Papineau]
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7872
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Teleosemantics equates meaning with the item the concept is intended to track
[Papineau]
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7873
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Young children can see that other individuals sometimes have false beliefs
[Papineau]
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7874
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Do we understand other minds by simulation-theory, or by theory-theory?
[Papineau]
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7879
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Mind-brain reduction is less explanatory, because phenomenal concepts lack causal roles
[Papineau]
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7881
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Accept ontological monism, but conceptual dualism; we think in a different way about phenomenal thought
[Papineau]
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7882
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Researching phenomenal consciousness is peculiar, because the concepts involved are peculiar
[Papineau]
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7883
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Verificationists tend to infer indefinite answers from undecidable questions
[Papineau]
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7885
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The 'actualist' HOT theory says consciousness comes from actual higher judgements of mental states
[Papineau]
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7886
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Actualist HOT theories imply that a non-conscious mental event could become conscious when remembered
[Papineau]
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7887
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States are conscious if they could be the subject of higher-order mental judgements
[Papineau]
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7888
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Higher-order judgements may be possible where the subject denies having been conscious
[Papineau]
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7889
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Our concept of consciousness is crude, and lacks theoretical articulation
[Papineau]
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7891
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We can’t decide what 'conscious' means, so it is undecidable whether cats are conscious
[Papineau]
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20974
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Modern biological research, especially into the cell, has revealed no special new natural forces
[Papineau]
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20975
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Quantum 'wave collapses' seem to violate conservation of energy
[Papineau]
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20970
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Determinism is possible without a complete physics, if mental forces play a role
[Papineau]
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20971
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Weak reduction of mind is to physical causes; strong reduction is also to physical laws
[Papineau]
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20976
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The completeness of physics cannot be proved
[Papineau]
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7892
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The completeness of physics is needed for mind-brain identity
[Papineau]
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