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Single Idea 7870
[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
]
Full Idea
Role concepts can be of two kinds: they can name whichever property realises the role, or they can name the higher property which constitutes the role.
Gist of Idea
Role concepts either name the realising property, or the higher property constituting the role
Source
David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], 4.2 n1)
Book Ref
Papineau,David: 'Thinking about Consciousness' [OUP 2004], p.98
A Reaction
This points strikes me as being crucial to discussions of mental functions. Perhaps labels of Realising Properties and Constituting Properties would help. Analytical philosophy rules.
The
18 ideas
with the same theme
[criticisms of the functionalist theory of mind]:
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2348
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Is there just one computational state for each specific belief?
[Putnam]
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2332
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Functionalism can't explain reference and truth, which are needed for logic
[Putnam]
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2071
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If concepts have external meaning, computational states won't explain psychology
[Putnam]
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3499
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Computation presupposes consciousness
[Searle]
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3501
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If we are computers, who is the user?
[Searle]
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3393
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How do functional states give rise to mental causation?
[Kim]
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2578
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Could a creature without a brain be in the right functional state for pain?
[Block]
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2585
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Not just any old functional network will have mental states
[Block]
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2586
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In functionalism, what are the special inputs and outputs of conscious creatures?
[Block]
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3514
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Functionalism needs causation and intentionality to explain actions
[Papineau]
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7870
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Role concepts either name the realising property, or the higher property constituting the role
[Papineau]
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3206
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One computer program could either play chess or fight a war
[Rey]
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2418
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The Chinese Mind doesn't seem conscious, but then nor do brains from outside
[Chalmers]
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7062
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Functionalism cannot explain consciousness just by functional organisation
[Heil]
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4624
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If you are a functionalist, there appears to be no room for qualia
[Heil]
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6623
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Functionalism can't distinguish our experiences in spectrum inversion
[Lowe]
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6628
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Functionalism only discusses relational properties of mental states, not intrinsic properties
[Lowe]
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6629
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Functionalism commits us to bizarre possibilities, such as 'zombies'
[Lowe]
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