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Full Idea
We may say that a perceptual concept refers to that entity which normally causes classificatory uses of that concept...but this won't work because such deployments are often caused by things which the concept doesn't refer to. A model might cause 'bird'.
Gist of Idea
Perceptual concepts can't just refer to what causes classification
Source
David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], 4.6)
Book Ref
Papineau,David: 'Thinking about Consciousness' [OUP 2004], p.113
A Reaction
This rejects the causal theory of perceptual concepts. I like the approach, because classifying things strikes me as absolutely basic to what brains do. To see that x is a bird is to place x in the class of birds.
| 5927 | I prefer the causal theory to sense data, because sensations are events, not apprehensions [Ross] |
| 5193 | Causal and representative theories of perception are wrong as they refer to unobservables [Ayer] |
| 3900 | Maybe experience is not essential to perception, but only to the causing of beliefs [Armstrong, by Scruton] |
| 2784 | Appearances don't guarantee reality, unless the appearance is actually caused by the reality [Dancy,J] |
| 2785 | Perceptual beliefs may be directly caused, but generalisations can't be [Dancy,J] |
| 7871 | Perceptual concepts can't just refer to what causes classification [Papineau] |
| 7711 | Science requires a causal theory - perception of an object must be an experience caused by the object [Lowe] |
| 6640 | A causal theorist can be a direct realist, if all objects of perception are external [Lowe] |
| 6645 | If blindsight shows we don't need perceptual experiences, the causal theory is wrong [Lowe] |
| 3757 | Causal theory says true perceptions must be caused by the object perceived [Bernecker/Dretske] |