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Single Idea 7875

[filed under theme 19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language ]

Full Idea

Let's assume the child is a genius and itself invents a name for the sensation! - But then, of course, he couldn't make himself understood when he used the word.

Gist of Idea

If a brilliant child invented a name for a private sensation, it couldn't communicate it

Source

Ludwig Wittgenstein (Philosophical Investigations [1952], §257)

Book Ref

Wittgenstein,Ludwig: 'Philosophical Investigations', ed/tr. Anscombe,E. [Blackwell 1972], p.92


A Reaction

[His example is a sensation with no behaviour] Sensations are not just related to behaviour; they are related to external objects, and to parts of the body. We doubt the sensations of others if they can't name the object or the body part.


The 21 ideas with the same theme [possibility of a solitary person having language]:

Since words are just conventional, we can represent our own ideas with any words we please [Locke]
Every person has his own language [Novalis]
Dewey argued long before Wittgenstein that there could not seriously be a private language [Dewey, by Orenstein]
The names in a logically perfect language would be private, and could not be shared [Russell]
To imagine a language means to imagine a form of life [Wittgenstein]
Was Wittgenstein's problem between individual and community, or between occasions for an individual? [Rowlands on Wittgenstein]
If a brilliant child invented a name for a private sensation, it couldn't communicate it [Wittgenstein]
We cannot doublecheck mental images for correctness (or confirm news with many copies of the paper) [Wittgenstein]
If we only named pain by our own case, it would be like naming beetles by looking in a private box [Wittgenstein]
If the reference is private, that is incompatible with the sense being public [Wittgenstein, by Scruton]
Getting from perceptions to words cannot be a private matter; the rules need an institution of use [Wittgenstein]
Solipsism is correct, but can only be shown, not said, by the limits of my personal language [Wittgenstein]
Language is more like a cooperative steamship than an individual hammer [Putnam]
A private language could work with reference and beliefs, and wouldn't need meaning [Putnam]
Thought is only fully developed if we communicate with others [Davidson]
Content of thought is established through communication, so knowledge needs other minds [Davidson]
The sceptical rule-following paradox is the basis of the private language argument [Kripke, by Hanna]
Forming concepts by abstraction from the Given is private definition, which the Private Lang. Arg. attacks [McDowell]
The theory of the content of thought as 'Mentalese' explains why the Private Language Argument doesn't work [Fodor]
The Private Language argument only means people may misjudge their experiences [Papineau]
Wittgenstein makes it impossible to build foundations from something that is totally private [Scruton]