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Full Idea
We cannot give materialist explanations of why brain yields phenomenal properties because phenomenal concepts are not associated with descriptions of causal roles in the same way as pre-theoretical terms in other areas of science.
Gist of Idea
Materialism won't explain phenomenal properties, because the latter aren't seen in causal roles
Source
comment on Joseph Levine (Purple Haze [2001]) by David Papineau - Thinking about Consciousness 5.1
Book Ref
Papineau,David: 'Thinking about Consciousness' [OUP 2004], p.143
A Reaction
I think Papineau has part of the answer, and I certainly like his notion of Conceptual Dualism, but if qualia are physical, there must be a physical account of how they acquire their properties. I think the whole brain needs to be understood first.
| 4989 | Physicalism should explain how subjective experience is possible, but not 'what it is like' [Kirk,R on Nagel] |
| 3375 | If an orange image is a brain state, are some parts of the brain orange? [Kim] |
| 7876 | Even if we identify pain with neural events, we can't explain why those neurons cause that feeling [Levine, by Papineau] |
| 7877 | Only phenomenal states have an explanatory gap; water is fully explained by H2O [Levine, by Papineau] |
| 7878 | Materialism won't explain phenomenal properties, because the latter aren't seen in causal roles [Papineau on Levine] |