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Single Idea 7885

[filed under theme 15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought ]

Full Idea

The 'actualist' HOT theory says that a state is conscious if the subject is 'aware' of it, where this is understood as a matter of the subject forming some actual Higher-Order judgement about it.

Clarification

HOT stands for higher-order thought

Gist of Idea

The 'actualist' HOT theory says consciousness comes from actual higher judgements of mental states

Source

David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], 7.11)

Book Ref

Papineau,David: 'Thinking about Consciousness' [OUP 2004], p.205


A Reaction

As stated there seems an obvious regress problem. Is the consciousness in the mental state, or in the higher awareness of it? If the former, how does being observed make it conscious? If the latter, what gives the higher level its consciousness?


The 16 ideas with the same theme [consciousness as higher levels of thinking]:

Consciousness is the perception of what passes in a man's own mind [Locke]
Kant thought that consciousness depends on self-consciousness ('apperception') [Kant, by Crane]
Consciousness is our awareness of our own mental life [Nietzsche]
Consciousness exists as consciousness of itself [Sartre]
It seems plausible that many animals have experiences without knowing about them [Perry]
We are probably the only creatures that can think about our own thoughts [Fodor]
The 'actualist' HOT theory says consciousness comes from actual higher judgements of mental states [Papineau]
Actualist HOT theories imply that a non-conscious mental event could become conscious when remembered [Papineau]
States are conscious if they could be the subject of higher-order mental judgements [Papineau]
Higher-order judgements may be possible where the subject denies having been conscious [Papineau]
If neither the first-level nor the second-level is itself conscious, there seems to be no consciousness present [Bonjour]
Consciousness of a belief isn't a belief that one has it [Peacocke]
Higher-order theories divide over whether the higher level involves thought or perception [Gulick]
Higher-order models reduce the problem of consciousness to intentionality [Gulick]
Maybe qualia only exist at the lower level, and a higher-level is needed for what-it-is-like [Gulick]
Unfortunately, higher-order representations could involve error [Kriegel/Williford]