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Single Idea 7886

[filed under theme 15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought ]

Full Idea

Actualist HOT theories face an awkward problem with memory judgements: ...how can an earlier mental state be rendered conscious by some later act of memory? As when I see a red pillar box with no higher-order judgement, and then recall it later.

Gist of Idea

Actualist HOT theories imply that a non-conscious mental event could become conscious when remembered

Source

David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], 7.11)

Book Ref

Papineau,David: 'Thinking about Consciousness' [OUP 2004], p.206

A Reaction

[See 7886 for 'Actualist' HOT theories] This is not altogether absurd. A red pillar box could be somewhere in my field of vision, and then I might suddenly become conscious of it (if it moved!). Police interrogation reminds me of what I only glimpsed.

Related Idea

Idea 7886 Actualist HOT theories imply that a non-conscious mental event could become conscious when remembered [Papineau]

The 16 ideas with the same theme [consciousness as higher levels of thinking]:

5002 Consciousness is the perception of what passes in a man's own mind [Locke]
4086 Kant thought that consciousness depends on self-consciousness ('apperception') [Kant, by Crane]
23190 Consciousness is our awareness of our own mental life [Nietzsche]
7111 Consciousness exists as consciousness of itself [Sartre]
4888 It seems plausible that many animals have experiences without knowing about them [Perry]
2453 We are probably the only creatures that can think about our own thoughts [Fodor]
7885 The 'actualist' HOT theory says consciousness comes from actual higher judgements of mental states [Papineau]
7886 Actualist HOT theories imply that a non-conscious mental event could become conscious when remembered [Papineau]
7887 States are conscious if they could be the subject of higher-order mental judgements [Papineau]
7888 Higher-order judgements may be possible where the subject denies having been conscious [Papineau]
8895 If neither the first-level nor the second-level is itself conscious, there seems to be no consciousness present [Bonjour]
12586 Consciousness of a belief isn't a belief that one has it [Peacocke]
9320 Higher-order theories divide over whether the higher level involves thought or perception [Gulick]
9321 Higher-order models reduce the problem of consciousness to intentionality [Gulick]
9322 Maybe qualia only exist at the lower level, and a higher-level is needed for what-it-is-like [Gulick]
9314 Unfortunately, higher-order representations could involve error [Kriegel/Williford]