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Single Idea 7887
[filed under theme 15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
]
Full Idea
The 'dispositional' HOT thesis says that a state is conscious just in case it could have been the subject of an introspective Higher-Order judgement, even if it wasn't actually so subject.
Clarification
HOT stands for higher-order thought
Gist of Idea
States are conscious if they could be the subject of higher-order mental judgements
Source
David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], 7.13)
Book Ref
Papineau,David: 'Thinking about Consciousness' [OUP 2004], p.210
A Reaction
[He cites Dennett and Carruthers for this view] This is designed to meet other problems, but it sounds odd. Does it really make no difference whether higher-judgement actually occurs? How can conscious events be distinguished once they've gone?
The
54 ideas
from David Papineau
3509
|
Externalism may be the key idea in philosophical naturalism
[Papineau]
|
3510
|
Epiphenomenalism is supervenience without physicalism
[Papineau]
|
3511
|
Supervenience requires all mental events to have physical effects
[Papineau]
|
3512
|
If a mental state is multiply realisable, why does it lead to similar behaviour?
[Papineau]
|
3513
|
How does a dualist mind represent, exist outside space, and be transparent to itself?
[Papineau]
|
3514
|
Functionalism needs causation and intentionality to explain actions
[Papineau]
|
3515
|
Knowing what it is like to be something only involves being (physically) that thing
[Papineau]
|
3516
|
The Private Language argument only means people may misjudge their experiences
[Papineau]
|
16369
|
There is a single file per object, memorised, reactivated, consolidated and expanded
[Papineau, by Recanati]
|
13407
|
All worthwhile philosophy is synthetic theorizing, evaluated by experience
[Papineau]
|
13406
|
A priori knowledge is analytic - the structure of our concepts - and hence unimportant
[Papineau]
|
13408
|
Intuition and thought-experiments embody substantial information about the world
[Papineau]
|
13409
|
Our best theories may commit us to mathematical abstracta, but that doesn't justify the commitment
[Papineau]
|
13410
|
Verificationism about concepts means you can't deny a theory, because you can't have the concept
[Papineau]
|
12583
|
Belief truth-conditions are normal circumstances where the belief is supposed to occur
[Papineau]
|
7890
|
Maybe a creature is conscious if its mental states represent things in a distinct way
[Papineau]
|
7884
|
Most reductive accounts of representation imply broad content
[Papineau]
|
7850
|
Thinking about a thing doesn't require activating it
[Papineau]
|
7851
|
Consciousness affects bodily movement, so thoughts must be material states
[Papineau]
|
7852
|
The only serious mind-brain theories now are identity, token identity, realization and supervenience
[Papineau]
|
7853
|
Causation is based on either events, or facts, or states of affairs
[Papineau]
|
7854
|
Whether octopuses feel pain is unclear, because our phenomenal concepts are too vague
[Papineau]
|
7856
|
It is absurd to think that physical effects are caused twice, so conscious causes must be physical
[Papineau]
|
7857
|
Causes are instantiations of properties by particulars, or they are themselves basic particulars
[Papineau]
|
7858
|
If causes are basic particulars, this doesn't make conscious and physical properties identical
[Papineau]
|
7860
|
The epiphenomenal relation of mind and brain is a 'causal dangler', unlike anything else
[Papineau]
|
7862
|
Maybe minds do not cause actions, but do cause us to report our decisions
[Papineau]
|
7863
|
If content hinges on matters outside of you, how can it causally influence your actions?
[Papineau]
|
7864
|
Maybe mind and body do overdetermine acts, but are linked (for some reason)
[Papineau]
|
7865
|
Supervenience can be replaced by identifying mind with higher-order or disjunctional properties
[Papineau]
|
7866
|
Mary acquires new concepts; she previously thought about the same property using material concepts
[Papineau]
|
7869
|
Truth conditions in possible worlds can't handle statements about impossibilities
[Papineau]
|
7868
|
Thought content is possible worlds that make the thought true; if that includes the actual world, it's true
[Papineau]
|
7870
|
Role concepts either name the realising property, or the higher property constituting the role
[Papineau]
|
7871
|
Perceptual concepts can't just refer to what causes classification
[Papineau]
|
7872
|
Teleosemantics equates meaning with the item the concept is intended to track
[Papineau]
|
7873
|
Young children can see that other individuals sometimes have false beliefs
[Papineau]
|
7874
|
Do we understand other minds by simulation-theory, or by theory-theory?
[Papineau]
|
7879
|
Mind-brain reduction is less explanatory, because phenomenal concepts lack causal roles
[Papineau]
|
7881
|
Accept ontological monism, but conceptual dualism; we think in a different way about phenomenal thought
[Papineau]
|
7882
|
Researching phenomenal consciousness is peculiar, because the concepts involved are peculiar
[Papineau]
|
7883
|
Verificationists tend to infer indefinite answers from undecidable questions
[Papineau]
|
7885
|
The 'actualist' HOT theory says consciousness comes from actual higher judgements of mental states
[Papineau]
|
7886
|
Actualist HOT theories imply that a non-conscious mental event could become conscious when remembered
[Papineau]
|
7887
|
States are conscious if they could be the subject of higher-order mental judgements
[Papineau]
|
7888
|
Higher-order judgements may be possible where the subject denies having been conscious
[Papineau]
|
7889
|
Our concept of consciousness is crude, and lacks theoretical articulation
[Papineau]
|
7891
|
We can’t decide what 'conscious' means, so it is undecidable whether cats are conscious
[Papineau]
|
20974
|
Modern biological research, especially into the cell, has revealed no special new natural forces
[Papineau]
|
20975
|
Quantum 'wave collapses' seem to violate conservation of energy
[Papineau]
|
20970
|
Determinism is possible without a complete physics, if mental forces play a role
[Papineau]
|
20971
|
Weak reduction of mind is to physical causes; strong reduction is also to physical laws
[Papineau]
|
7892
|
The completeness of physics is needed for mind-brain identity
[Papineau]
|
20976
|
The completeness of physics cannot be proved
[Papineau]
|