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Single Idea 7889
[filed under theme 15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
]
Full Idea
Our phenomenal concept of consciousness-as-such is a crude tool, lacking theoretical articulation
Gist of Idea
Our concept of consciousness is crude, and lacks theoretical articulation
Source
David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], 7.13)
Book Ref
Papineau,David: 'Thinking about Consciousness' [OUP 2004], p.215
A Reaction
This is a point well made. Given that the human brain is the most complex thing (for its size) in the known universe, we shouldn't expect it to divide up into three or four clear-cut activities. Compare the precision of 'geography' as a concept.
The
54 ideas
from David Papineau
3509
|
Externalism may be the key idea in philosophical naturalism
[Papineau]
|
3510
|
Epiphenomenalism is supervenience without physicalism
[Papineau]
|
3511
|
Supervenience requires all mental events to have physical effects
[Papineau]
|
3512
|
If a mental state is multiply realisable, why does it lead to similar behaviour?
[Papineau]
|
3513
|
How does a dualist mind represent, exist outside space, and be transparent to itself?
[Papineau]
|
3514
|
Functionalism needs causation and intentionality to explain actions
[Papineau]
|
3515
|
Knowing what it is like to be something only involves being (physically) that thing
[Papineau]
|
3516
|
The Private Language argument only means people may misjudge their experiences
[Papineau]
|
16369
|
There is a single file per object, memorised, reactivated, consolidated and expanded
[Papineau, by Recanati]
|
13407
|
All worthwhile philosophy is synthetic theorizing, evaluated by experience
[Papineau]
|
13406
|
A priori knowledge is analytic - the structure of our concepts - and hence unimportant
[Papineau]
|
13408
|
Intuition and thought-experiments embody substantial information about the world
[Papineau]
|
13409
|
Our best theories may commit us to mathematical abstracta, but that doesn't justify the commitment
[Papineau]
|
13410
|
Verificationism about concepts means you can't deny a theory, because you can't have the concept
[Papineau]
|
12583
|
Belief truth-conditions are normal circumstances where the belief is supposed to occur
[Papineau]
|
7890
|
Maybe a creature is conscious if its mental states represent things in a distinct way
[Papineau]
|
7884
|
Most reductive accounts of representation imply broad content
[Papineau]
|
7850
|
Thinking about a thing doesn't require activating it
[Papineau]
|
7853
|
Causation is based on either events, or facts, or states of affairs
[Papineau]
|
7851
|
Consciousness affects bodily movement, so thoughts must be material states
[Papineau]
|
7852
|
The only serious mind-brain theories now are identity, token identity, realization and supervenience
[Papineau]
|
7854
|
Whether octopuses feel pain is unclear, because our phenomenal concepts are too vague
[Papineau]
|
7856
|
It is absurd to think that physical effects are caused twice, so conscious causes must be physical
[Papineau]
|
7857
|
Causes are instantiations of properties by particulars, or they are themselves basic particulars
[Papineau]
|
7858
|
If causes are basic particulars, this doesn't make conscious and physical properties identical
[Papineau]
|
7863
|
If content hinges on matters outside of you, how can it causally influence your actions?
[Papineau]
|
7860
|
The epiphenomenal relation of mind and brain is a 'causal dangler', unlike anything else
[Papineau]
|
7862
|
Maybe minds do not cause actions, but do cause us to report our decisions
[Papineau]
|
7864
|
Maybe mind and body do overdetermine acts, but are linked (for some reason)
[Papineau]
|
7865
|
Supervenience can be replaced by identifying mind with higher-order or disjunctional properties
[Papineau]
|
7866
|
Mary acquires new concepts; she previously thought about the same property using material concepts
[Papineau]
|
7869
|
Truth conditions in possible worlds can't handle statements about impossibilities
[Papineau]
|
7868
|
Thought content is possible worlds that make the thought true; if that includes the actual world, it's true
[Papineau]
|
7870
|
Role concepts either name the realising property, or the higher property constituting the role
[Papineau]
|
7871
|
Perceptual concepts can't just refer to what causes classification
[Papineau]
|
7872
|
Teleosemantics equates meaning with the item the concept is intended to track
[Papineau]
|
7873
|
Young children can see that other individuals sometimes have false beliefs
[Papineau]
|
7874
|
Do we understand other minds by simulation-theory, or by theory-theory?
[Papineau]
|
7879
|
Mind-brain reduction is less explanatory, because phenomenal concepts lack causal roles
[Papineau]
|
7881
|
Accept ontological monism, but conceptual dualism; we think in a different way about phenomenal thought
[Papineau]
|
7882
|
Researching phenomenal consciousness is peculiar, because the concepts involved are peculiar
[Papineau]
|
7883
|
Verificationists tend to infer indefinite answers from undecidable questions
[Papineau]
|
7885
|
The 'actualist' HOT theory says consciousness comes from actual higher judgements of mental states
[Papineau]
|
7886
|
Actualist HOT theories imply that a non-conscious mental event could become conscious when remembered
[Papineau]
|
7887
|
States are conscious if they could be the subject of higher-order mental judgements
[Papineau]
|
7888
|
Higher-order judgements may be possible where the subject denies having been conscious
[Papineau]
|
7889
|
Our concept of consciousness is crude, and lacks theoretical articulation
[Papineau]
|
7891
|
We can’t decide what 'conscious' means, so it is undecidable whether cats are conscious
[Papineau]
|
20974
|
Modern biological research, especially into the cell, has revealed no special new natural forces
[Papineau]
|
20975
|
Quantum 'wave collapses' seem to violate conservation of energy
[Papineau]
|
20970
|
Determinism is possible without a complete physics, if mental forces play a role
[Papineau]
|
20971
|
Weak reduction of mind is to physical causes; strong reduction is also to physical laws
[Papineau]
|
7892
|
The completeness of physics is needed for mind-brain identity
[Papineau]
|
20976
|
The completeness of physics cannot be proved
[Papineau]
|