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Single Idea 7891
[filed under theme 15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
]
Full Idea
If consciousness is availability for HOT judgements, then cats are not conscious, but if it consists in attention, then they are. I say the concept of consciousness is indefinite between the two, so there is no fact about whether cats are conscious.
Clarification
HOT means higher-order thought
Gist of Idea
We can’t decide what 'conscious' means, so it is undecidable whether cats are conscious
Source
David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], 7.16)
Book Ref
Papineau,David: 'Thinking about Consciousness' [OUP 2004], p.227
A Reaction
Nice point. My personal view is that the question of whether cats are conscious is hopeless because philosophers insist on making consciousness all-or-nothing (e.g. Idea 5786). If I experienced cat mentality, I might say I was 'semi-conscious'.
Related Idea
Idea 5786
A system is either conscious or it isn't, though the intensity varies a lot [Searle]
The
21 ideas
with the same theme
[general ideas about consciousness]:
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7995
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In all living beings I am the light of consciousness, says Krishna
[Anon (Bhag)]
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19354
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Leibniz introduced the idea of degrees of consciousness, essential for his monads
[Leibniz, by Perkins]
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23658
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Consciousness is an indefinable and unique operation
[Reid]
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4166
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A consciousness without an object is no consciousness
[Schopenhauer]
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23872
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'Society determines consciousness' is contradictory; society only exists in minds
[Weil on Marx/Engels]
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5277
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Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life
[Marx/Engels]
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19626
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Our instincts had to be blunted and diminished, to make way for consciousness!
[Cioran]
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21941
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Unlike Marxists, Foucault explains thought internally, without deference to conscious ideas
[Foucault, by Gutting]
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5786
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A system is either conscious or it isn't, though the intensity varies a lot
[Searle]
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5794
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Consciousness has a first-person ontology, which only exists from a subjective viewpoint
[Searle]
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5795
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There isn't one consciousness (information-processing) which can be investigated, and another (phenomenal) which can't
[Searle]
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4884
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Brain states must be in my head, and yet the pain seems to be in my hand
[Perry]
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2528
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Does consciousness need the concept of consciousness?
[Dennett]
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7367
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Perhaps the brain doesn't 'fill in' gaps in consciousness if no one is looking.
[Dennett]
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7393
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We can't draw a clear line between conscious and unconscious
[Dennett]
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4880
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Sentience comes in grades from robotic to super-human; we only draw a line for moral reasons
[Dennett]
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7854
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Whether octopuses feel pain is unclear, because our phenomenal concepts are too vague
[Papineau]
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7889
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Our concept of consciousness is crude, and lacks theoretical articulation
[Papineau]
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7891
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We can’t decide what 'conscious' means, so it is undecidable whether cats are conscious
[Papineau]
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4621
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Whatever exists has qualities, so it is no surprise that states of minds have qualities
[Heil]
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6668
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If the present does not exist, then consciousness must be memory of the immediate past
[Marshall]
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