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Single Idea 7919
[filed under theme 1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics
]
Full Idea
Thinkers from Hume to the logical positivists took exception to Kant's view that some synthetic propositions could be known a priori, and so rejected the possibility of metaphysics as Kant conceived of it.
Gist of Idea
Humeans rejected the a priori synthetic, and so rejected even Kantian metaphysics
Source
report of A.J. Ayer (Language,Truth and Logic [1936]) by Cynthia Macdonald - Varieties of Things Ch.1
Book Ref
Macdonald,Cynthia: 'Varieties of Things' [Blackwell 2005], p.15
A Reaction
See Idea 7918 for Kant's epistemological view of metaphysics. This strikes me as a big misunderstanding by empiricists, even though they are quite right to insist on evidence and proof. Metaphysics is essential, but its excess is the worst nonsense.
Related Ideas
Idea 7918
Kant turned metaphysics into epistemology, ignoring Aristotle's 'being qua being' [Kant, by Macdonald,C]
Idea 16931
Metaphysics is generating a priori knowledge by intuition and concepts, leading to the synthetic [Kant]
The
41 ideas
from 'Language,Truth and Logic'
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7919
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Humeans rejected the a priori synthetic, and so rejected even Kantian metaphysics
[Ayer, by Macdonald,C]
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6523
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Positivists regard ontology as either meaningless or stipulated
[Ayer, by Robinson,H]
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6525
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Logical positivists could never give the sense-data equivalent of 'there is a table next door'
[Robinson,H on Ayer]
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6524
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Positivists prefer sense-data to objects, because the vocabulary covers both illusions and perceptions
[Ayer, by Robinson,H]
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4729
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Empiricism lacked a decent account of the a priori, until Ayer said it was entirely analytic
[O'Grady on Ayer]
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5180
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All propositions (especially 'metaphysics') must begin with the senses
[Ayer]
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5185
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It is further sense-experience which informs us of the mistakes that arise out of sense-experience
[Ayer]
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5187
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When we ascribe an attribute to a thing, we covertly assert that it exists
[Ayer]
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5183
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Only tautologies can be certain; other propositions can only be probable
[Ayer]
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5179
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Philosophy deals with the questions that scientists do not wish to handle
[Ayer]
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5181
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A sentence is factually significant to someone if they know how to verify its proposition
[Ayer]
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5184
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Factual propositions imply (in conjunction with a few other premises) possible experiences
[Ayer]
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5186
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Tautologies and empirical hypotheses form the entire class of significant propositions
[Ayer]
|
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5190
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The induction problem is to prove generalisations about the future based on the past
[Ayer]
|
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5191
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We can't use the uniformity of nature to prove induction, as that would be circular
[Ayer]
|
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5195
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Critics say analysis can only show the parts, and not their distinctive configuration
[Ayer]
|
|
5196
|
Philosophy is a department of logic
[Ayer]
|
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5189
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Philosophers should abandon speculation, as philosophy is wholly critical
[Ayer]
|
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5193
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Causal and representative theories of perception are wrong as they refer to unobservables
[Ayer]
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5197
|
By changing definitions we could make 'a thing can't be in two places at once' a contradiction
[Ayer]
|
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5198
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We could verify 'a thing can't be in two places at once' by destroying one of the things
[Ierubino on Ayer]
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2619
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Whether geometry can be applied to reality is an empirical question outside of geometry
[Ayer]
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5204
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To say that a proposition is true a priori is to say that it is a tautology
[Ayer]
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5200
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The main claim of rationalism is that thought is an independent source of knowledge
[Ayer]
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5202
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Maths and logic are true universally because they are analytic or tautological
[Ayer]
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5199
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Empiricism, it is said, cannot account for our knowledge of necessary truths
[Ayer]
|
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4749
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We cannot analyse the concept of 'truth', because it is simply a mark that a sentence is asserted
[Ayer]
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5205
|
Moral intuition is worthless if there is no criterion to decide between intuitions
[Ayer]
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23725
|
Ayer defends the emotivist version of expressivism
[Ayer, by Smith,M]
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5206
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To say an act is wrong makes no further statement about it, but merely expresses disapproval
[Ayer]
|
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5207
|
If theism is non-sensical, then so is atheism.
[Ayer]
|
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5208
|
A person with non-empirical attributes is unintelligible.
[Ayer]
|
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5209
|
The 'truths' expressed by theists are not literally significant
[Ayer]
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5169
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My empiricism logically distinguishes analytic and synthetic propositions, and metaphysical verbiage
[Ayer]
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5177
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Other minds are 'metaphysical' objects, because I can never observe their experiences
[Ayer]
|
|
5178
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A conscious object is by definition one that behaves in a certain way, so behaviour proves consciousness
[Ayer]
|
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5172
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If the self is meaningful, it must be constructed from sense-experiences
[Ayer]
|
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5173
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Two experiences belong to one self if their contents belong with one body
[Ayer]
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5176
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Empiricists can define personal identity as bodily identity, which consists of sense-contents
[Ayer]
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5171
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The supposed 'gulf' between mind and matter is based on the senseless concept of 'substances'
[Ayer]
|
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5170
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Material things are constructions from actual and possible occurrences of sense-contents
[Ayer]
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