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Single Idea 7920
[filed under theme 1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
]
Full Idea
Descriptive metaphysics (e.g. Aristotle and Kant) is content to describe the actual structure of our thought about the world; revisionary metaphysics (e.g. Descartes, Leibniz, Berkeley) is concerned to produce a better structure.
Gist of Idea
Descriptive metaphysics aims at actual structure, revisionary metaphysics at a better structure
Source
Peter F. Strawson (Individuals:Essay in Descript Metaphysics [1959], Intro)
Book Ref
Strawson,Peter F.: 'Individuals: Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics' [Methuen University 1974], p.9
A Reaction
This distinction by Strawson was incredibly helpful in reinstating metaphysics as a feasible activity. I don't want to abandon the revisionary version. We can hammer the current metaphysics into a more efficient shape, or even create new concepts.
Related Idea
Idea 17275
Realist metaphysics concerns what is real; naive metaphysics concerns natures of things [Fine,K]
The
20 ideas
from Peter F. Strawson
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16979
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It makes no sense to ask of some individual thing what it is that makes it that individual
[Strawson,P]
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16980
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We need a logical use of 'object' as predicate-worthy, and an 'ontological' use
[Strawson,P]
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7920
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Descriptive metaphysics aims at actual structure, revisionary metaphysics at a better structure
[Strawson,P]
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7922
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Descriptive metaphysics concerns unchanging core concepts and categories
[Strawson,P]
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7921
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Close examination of actual word usage is the only sure way in philosophy
[Strawson,P]
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9282
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I can only apply consciousness predicates to myself if I can apply them to others
[Strawson,P]
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9263
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A person is an entity to which we can ascribe predicates of consciousness and corporeality
[Strawson,P]
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9281
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The idea of a predicate matches a range of things to which it can be applied
[Strawson,P]
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10430
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Reference is mainly a social phenomenon
[Strawson,P, by Sainsbury]
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10448
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If an expression can refer to anything, it may still instrinsically refer, but relative to a context
[Bach on Strawson,P]
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6413
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'The present King of France is bald' presupposes existence, rather than stating it
[Strawson,P, by Grayling]
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8354
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Russell asks when 'The King of France is wise' would be a true assertion
[Strawson,P]
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8355
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Expressions don't refer; people use expressions to refer
[Strawson,P]
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8357
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If an utterance fails to refer then it is a pseudo-use, though a speaker may think they assert something
[Strawson,P]
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8356
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The meaning of an expression or sentence is general directions for its use, to refer or to assert
[Strawson,P]
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8358
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There are no rules for the exact logic of ordinary language, because that doesn't exist
[Strawson,P]
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10841
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The word 'true' always refers to a possible statement
[Strawson,P]
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10842
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The fact which is stated by a true sentence is not something in the world
[Strawson,P]
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10843
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Facts aren't exactly true statements, but they are what those statements say
[Strawson,P]
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10844
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The statement that it is raining perfectly fits the fact that it is raining
[Strawson,P]
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