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Full Idea
The lack of a proper identity concept for attributes (properties) is a lack that philosophers feel impelled to supply; for, what sense is there in saying there are attributes when there is no sense in saying when there is one attribute and when two?
Gist of Idea
There is no proper identity concept for properties, and it is hard to distinguish one from two
Source
Willard Quine (Speaking of Objects [1960], IV)
Book Ref
Quine,Willard: 'Ontological Relativity and Other Essays' [Columbia 1969], p.19
A Reaction
This strikes me as being a really crucial question. There is a mistaken tendency to take any possible linguistic predicate as implying a natural property. I sympathise with the sceptics here (see Ideas 4029, 3906, 3322). How to individuate properties?
Related Ideas
Idea 4029 Nominalists ask why we should postulate properties at all [Mellor/Oliver]
Idea 3906 If possible worlds are needed to define properties, maybe we should abandon properties [Scruton]
Idea 3322 Quine says that if second-order logic is to quantify over properties, that can be done in first-order predicate logic [Quine, by Benardete,JA]
Idea 23227 Each object has a precise number of properties, each to a precise degree [Fichte]
| 16621 | Accidents are not parts of bodies (like blood in a cloth); they have accidents as things have a size [Hobbes] |
| 4546 | We realise that properties are sensations of the feeling subject, not part of the thing [Nietzsche] |
| 6063 | Russell can't attribute existence to properties [McGinn on Russell] |
| 18439 | Because things can share attributes, we cannot individuate attributes clearly [Quine] |
| 9017 | Predicates are not names; predicates are the other parties to predication [Quine] |
| 7925 | There is no proper identity concept for properties, and it is hard to distinguish one from two [Quine] |
| 10295 | Quine suggests that properties can be replaced with extensional entities like sets [Quine, by Shapiro] |
| 3322 | Quine says that if second-order logic is to quantify over properties, that can be done in first-order predicate logic [Quine, by Benardete,JA] |
| 6078 | Quine brought classes into semantics to get rid of properties [Quine, by McGinn] |
| 8479 | Don't analyse 'red is a colour' as involving properties. Say 'all red things are coloured things' [Quine, by Orenstein] |
| 7618 | Very nominalistic philosophers deny properties, though scientists accept them [Putnam] |
| 5456 | Redness is not a property as it is not mind-independent [Ellis] |
| 8959 | Field presumes properties can be eliminated from science [Field,H, by Szabó] |
| 3906 | If possible worlds are needed to define properties, maybe we should abandon properties [Scruton] |
| 4029 | Nominalists ask why we should postulate properties at all [Mellor/Oliver] |
| 16263 | Fundamental physics seems to suggest there are no such things as properties [Maudlin] |
| 7965 | Does the knowledge of each property require an infinity of accompanying knowledge? [Macdonald,C] |
| 19121 | We can reduce properties to true formulas [Halbach/Leigh] |