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Single Idea 7931

[filed under theme 9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique ]

Full Idea

For Leibniz, to distinguish between a substance and its properties in order to provide a thing or entity in which properties can inhere leads necessarily to the absurd conclusion that the substance itself must be a truly characterless non-entity.

Gist of Idea

If a substance is just a thing that has properties, it seems to be a characterless non-entity

Source

report of Gottfried Leibniz (Monadology [1716]) by Cynthia Macdonald - Varieties of Things Ch.3

Book Ref

Macdonald,Cynthia: 'Varieties of Things' [Blackwell 2005], p.83

A Reaction

This is obviously one of the basic thoughts in any discussion of substances. It is why physicists ignore them, and Leibniz opted for a 'bundle' theory. But the alternative seems daft too - free-floating properties, hooked onto one another.

The 20 ideas with the same theme [objections to the very concept of substances]:

3628 Substance cannot be conceived or explained to others [Gassendi on Descartes]
16774 Descartes thinks distinguishing substances from aggregates is pointless [Descartes, by Pasnau]
12485 We don't know what substance is, and only vaguely know what it does [Locke]
7931 If a substance is just a thing that has properties, it seems to be a characterless non-entity [Leibniz, by Macdonald,C]
16636 A die has no distinct subject, but is merely a name for its modes or accidents [Berkeley]
12048 The only meaning we have for substance is a collection of qualities [Hume]
13424 Aristotelians propose accidents supported by substance, but they don't understand either of them [Hume]
11833 The substance, once the predicates are removed, remains unknown to us [Kant]
18981 'Substance' is just a word for groupings and structures in experience [James]
14733 An object produces the same percepts with or without a substance, so that is irrelevant to science [Russell]
6465 We need not deny substance, but there seems no reason to assert it [Russell]
6471 The assumption by physicists of permanent substance is not metaphysically legitimate [Russell]
15304 We can escape substance and its properties, if we take fields of pure powers as ultimate [Harré/Madden]
7046 Rather than 'substance' I use 'objects', which have properties [Heil]
12252 Empiricists gave up 'substance', as unknowable substratum, or reducible to a bundle [Oderberg]
7932 A phenomenalist cannot distinguish substance from attribute, so must accept the bundle view [Macdonald,C]
7937 When we ascribe a property to a substance, the bundle theory will make that a tautology [Macdonald,C]
7939 Substances persist through change, but the bundle theory says they can't [Macdonald,C]
7940 A substance might be a sequence of bundles, rather than a single bundle [Macdonald,C]
16775 For corpuscularians, a substance is just its integral parts [Pasnau]