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Single Idea 7931
[filed under theme 9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
]
Full Idea
For Leibniz, to distinguish between a substance and its properties in order to provide a thing or entity in which properties can inhere leads necessarily to the absurd conclusion that the substance itself must be a truly characterless non-entity.
Gist of Idea
If a substance is just a thing that has properties, it seems to be a characterless non-entity
Source
report of Gottfried Leibniz (Monadology [1716]) by Cynthia Macdonald - Varieties of Things Ch.3
Book Ref
Macdonald,Cynthia: 'Varieties of Things' [Blackwell 2005], p.83
A Reaction
This is obviously one of the basic thoughts in any discussion of substances. It is why physicists ignore them, and Leibniz opted for a 'bundle' theory. But the alternative seems daft too - free-floating properties, hooked onto one another.
The
20 ideas
with the same theme
[objections to the very concept of substances]:
3628
|
Substance cannot be conceived or explained to others
[Gassendi on Descartes]
|
16774
|
Descartes thinks distinguishing substances from aggregates is pointless
[Descartes, by Pasnau]
|
12485
|
We don't know what substance is, and only vaguely know what it does
[Locke]
|
7931
|
If a substance is just a thing that has properties, it seems to be a characterless non-entity
[Leibniz, by Macdonald,C]
|
16636
|
A die has no distinct subject, but is merely a name for its modes or accidents
[Berkeley]
|
12048
|
The only meaning we have for substance is a collection of qualities
[Hume]
|
13424
|
Aristotelians propose accidents supported by substance, but they don't understand either of them
[Hume]
|
11833
|
The substance, once the predicates are removed, remains unknown to us
[Kant]
|
18981
|
'Substance' is just a word for groupings and structures in experience
[James]
|
14733
|
An object produces the same percepts with or without a substance, so that is irrelevant to science
[Russell]
|
6465
|
We need not deny substance, but there seems no reason to assert it
[Russell]
|
6471
|
The assumption by physicists of permanent substance is not metaphysically legitimate
[Russell]
|
15304
|
We can escape substance and its properties, if we take fields of pure powers as ultimate
[Harré/Madden]
|
7046
|
Rather than 'substance' I use 'objects', which have properties
[Heil]
|
12252
|
Empiricists gave up 'substance', as unknowable substratum, or reducible to a bundle
[Oderberg]
|
7932
|
A phenomenalist cannot distinguish substance from attribute, so must accept the bundle view
[Macdonald,C]
|
7937
|
When we ascribe a property to a substance, the bundle theory will make that a tautology
[Macdonald,C]
|
7939
|
Substances persist through change, but the bundle theory says they can't
[Macdonald,C]
|
7940
|
A substance might be a sequence of bundles, rather than a single bundle
[Macdonald,C]
|
16775
|
For corpuscularians, a substance is just its integral parts
[Pasnau]
|