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Single Idea 7931

[filed under theme 9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique ]

Full Idea

For Leibniz, to distinguish between a substance and its properties in order to provide a thing or entity in which properties can inhere leads necessarily to the absurd conclusion that the substance itself must be a truly characterless non-entity.

Gist of Idea

If a substance is just a thing that has properties, it seems to be a characterless non-entity

Source

report of Gottfried Leibniz (Monadology [1716]) by Cynthia Macdonald - Varieties of Things Ch.3

Book Ref

Macdonald,Cynthia: 'Varieties of Things' [Blackwell 2005], p.83


A Reaction

This is obviously one of the basic thoughts in any discussion of substances. It is why physicists ignore them, and Leibniz opted for a 'bundle' theory. But the alternative seems daft too - free-floating properties, hooked onto one another.


The 19 ideas from 'Monadology'

The monad idea incomprehensibly spiritualises matter, instead of materialising soul [La Mettrie on Leibniz]
He replaced Aristotelian continuants with monads [Leibniz, by Wiggins]
Is a drop of urine really an infinity of thinking monads? [Voltaire on Leibniz]
It is unclear in 'Monadology' how extended bodies relate to mind-like monads. [Garber on Leibniz]
If a substance is just a thing that has properties, it seems to be a characterless non-entity [Leibniz, by Macdonald,C]
The true elements are atomic monads [Leibniz]
There must be some internal difference between any two beings in nature [Leibniz]
Changes in a monad come from an internal principle, and the diversity within its substance [Leibniz]
Increase a conscious machine to the size of a mill - you still won't see perceptions in it [Leibniz]
A 'monad' has basic perception and appetite; a 'soul' has distinct perception and memory [Leibniz]
We all expect the sun to rise tomorrow by experience, but astronomers expect it by reason [Leibniz]
We know the 'I' and its contents by abstraction from awareness of necessary truths [Leibniz]
Falsehood involves a contradiction, and truth is contradictory of falsehood [Leibniz]
No fact can be real and no proposition true unless there is a Sufficient Reason (even if we can't know it) [Leibniz]
Truths of reason are known by analysis, and are necessary; facts are contingent, and their opposites possible [Leibniz]
Mathematical analysis ends in primitive principles, which cannot be and need not be demonstrated [Leibniz]
God alone (the Necessary Being) has the privilege that He must exist if He is possible [Leibniz]
This is the most perfect possible universe, in its combination of variety with order [Leibniz]
Everything in the universe is interconnected, so potentially a mind could know everything [Leibniz]