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Single Idea 7933
[filed under theme 2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 5. Fallacy of Composition
]
Full Idea
The fallacy of composition makes the erroneous assumption that every property of the things that constitute a thing is a property of the thing as well. But every large object is constituted by small parts, and every red object by colourless parts.
Gist of Idea
Don't assume that a thing has all the properties of its parts
Source
Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.5)
Book Ref
Macdonald,Cynthia: 'Varieties of Things' [Blackwell 2005], p.85
A Reaction
There are nice questions here like 'If you add lots of smallness together, why don't you get extreme smallness?' Colours always make bad examples in such cases (see Idea 5456). Distinctions are needed here (e.g. Idea 7007).
Related Idea
Idea 7007
I think of properties as simultaneously dispositional and qualitative [Heil]
The
32 ideas
from Cynthia Macdonald
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7923
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'Did it for the sake of x' doesn't involve a sake, so how can ontological commitments be inferred?
[Macdonald,C]
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7965
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Does the knowledge of each property require an infinity of accompanying knowledge?
[Macdonald,C]
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7926
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We 'individuate' kinds of object, and 'identify' particular specimens
[Macdonald,C]
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7927
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At different times Leibniz articulated three different versions of his so-called Law
[Macdonald,C]
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7928
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The Identity of Indiscernibles is false, because it is not necessarily true
[Macdonald,C]
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7936
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Unlike bundles of properties, substances have an intrinsic unity
[Macdonald,C]
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7930
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The bundle theory of substance implies the identity of indiscernibles
[Macdonald,C]
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7932
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A phenomenalist cannot distinguish substance from attribute, so must accept the bundle view
[Macdonald,C]
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7937
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When we ascribe a property to a substance, the bundle theory will make that a tautology
[Macdonald,C]
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7939
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Substances persist through change, but the bundle theory says they can't
[Macdonald,C]
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7940
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A substance might be a sequence of bundles, rather than a single bundle
[Macdonald,C]
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7929
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A substance is either a bundle of properties, or a bare substratum, or an essence
[Macdonald,C]
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7941
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Each substance contains a non-property, which is its substratum or bare particular
[Macdonald,C]
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7942
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The substratum theory explains the unity of substances, and their survival through change
[Macdonald,C]
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7943
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A substratum has the quality of being bare, and they are useless because indiscernible
[Macdonald,C]
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7934
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Tropes are abstract (two can occupy the same place), but not universals (they have locations)
[Macdonald,C]
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7938
|
Relational properties are clearly not essential to substances
[Macdonald,C]
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7944
|
Reduce by bridge laws (plus property identities?), by elimination, or by reducing talk
[Macdonald,C]
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7947
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In continuity, what matters is not just the beginning and end states, but the process itself
[Macdonald,C]
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7948
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A statue and its matter have different persistence conditions, so they are not identical
[Macdonald,C]
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7933
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Don't assume that a thing has all the properties of its parts
[Macdonald,C]
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7950
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Philosophy tries to explain how the actual is possible, given that it seems impossible
[Macdonald,C]
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7958
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Properties are sets of exactly resembling property-particulars
[Macdonald,C]
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7967
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Being taller is an external relation, but properties and substances have internal relations
[Macdonald,C]
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7955
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Resemblance Nominalism cannot explain either new resemblances, or absence of resemblances
[Macdonald,C]
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7961
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A 'thing' cannot be in two places at once, and two things cannot be in the same place at once
[Macdonald,C]
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7959
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How do a group of resembling tropes all resemble one another in the same way?
[Macdonald,C]
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7960
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Trope Nominalism is the only nominalism to introduce new entities, inviting Ockham's Razor
[Macdonald,C]
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7951
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Numerical sameness is explained by theories of identity, but what explains qualitative identity?
[Macdonald,C]
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7964
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How can universals connect instances, if they are nothing like them?
[Macdonald,C]
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7971
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Real Nominalism is only committed to concrete particulars, word-tokens, and (possibly) sets
[Macdonald,C]
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7972
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Tropes are abstract particulars, not concrete particulars, so the theory is not nominalist
[Macdonald,C]
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