more from this thinker     |     more from this text


Single Idea 7937

[filed under theme 9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique ]

Full Idea

The bundle theory makes all true statements ascribing properties to substances uninformative, by making them logical truths. The property of being a feline animal is literally a constituent of a cat.

Gist of Idea

When we ascribe a property to a substance, the bundle theory will make that a tautology

Source

Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.3)

Book Ref

Macdonald,Cynthia: 'Varieties of Things' [Blackwell 2005], p.95


A Reaction

The solution would seem to a distinction between accidental and essential properties. Compare 'that plane is red' with 'that plane has wings'. 'Of course it does - it's a plane'. We might still survive without a plane-substance.


The 20 ideas with the same theme [objections to the very concept of substances]:

Substance cannot be conceived or explained to others [Gassendi on Descartes]
Descartes thinks distinguishing substances from aggregates is pointless [Descartes, by Pasnau]
We don't know what substance is, and only vaguely know what it does [Locke]
If a substance is just a thing that has properties, it seems to be a characterless non-entity [Leibniz, by Macdonald,C]
A die has no distinct subject, but is merely a name for its modes or accidents [Berkeley]
The only meaning we have for substance is a collection of qualities [Hume]
Aristotelians propose accidents supported by substance, but they don't understand either of them [Hume]
The substance, once the predicates are removed, remains unknown to us [Kant]
'Substance' is just a word for groupings and structures in experience [James]
An object produces the same percepts with or without a substance, so that is irrelevant to science [Russell]
We need not deny substance, but there seems no reason to assert it [Russell]
The assumption by physicists of permanent substance is not metaphysically legitimate [Russell]
We can escape substance and its properties, if we take fields of pure powers as ultimate [Harré/Madden]
Rather than 'substance' I use 'objects', which have properties [Heil]
Empiricists gave up 'substance', as unknowable substratum, or reducible to a bundle [Oderberg]
A phenomenalist cannot distinguish substance from attribute, so must accept the bundle view [Macdonald,C]
When we ascribe a property to a substance, the bundle theory will make that a tautology [Macdonald,C]
Substances persist through change, but the bundle theory says they can't [Macdonald,C]
A substance might be a sequence of bundles, rather than a single bundle [Macdonald,C]
For corpuscularians, a substance is just its integral parts [Pasnau]