more from this thinker     |     more from this text

Single Idea 7946

[filed under theme 16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity ]

Full Idea

The memory criterion for personal identity permits 'branching' (where two things can later meet the criteria of persistence of a single earlier thing), which presents it with serious problems.

Gist of Idea

The memory criterion has a problem when one thing branches into two things

Source

report of Bernard Williams (Personal Identity and Individuation [1956]) by Cynthia Macdonald - Varieties of Things Ch.4

Book Ref

Macdonald,Cynthia: 'Varieties of Things' [Blackwell 2005], p.144

A Reaction

Of course, any notion of personal identity would have serious problem if people could branch into two, like fissioning amoeba. If that happened, we probably wouldn't have had a strong notion of personal identity in the first place. See Parfit.

The 22 ideas with the same theme [Self as the continuity of our conscious existence]:

1650 For Socrates our soul, though hard to define, is our self [Vlastos on Socrates]
21828 A person is the whole of their soul [Plotinus]
5511 For Locke, conscious awareness unifies a person at an instant and over time [Locke, by Martin/Barresi]
12509 If the soul individuates a man, and souls are transferable, then a hog could be a man [Locke]
1376 Identity must be in consciousness not substance, because it seems transferable [Locke]
12512 If someone becomes conscious of Nestor's actions, then he is Nestor [Locke]
12513 If a prince's soul entered a cobbler's body, the person would be the prince (and the man the cobbler) [Locke]
12514 On Judgement Day, no one will be punished for actions they cannot remember [Locke]
1397 Locke sees underlying substance as irrelevant to personal identity [Locke, by Noonan]
12973 We know our own identity by psychological continuity, even if there are some gaps [Leibniz]
21306 Causation unites our perceptions, by producing, destroying and modifying each other [Hume]
21311 Are self and substance the same? Then how can self remain if substance changes? [Hume]
7546 A man is a succession of momentary men, bound by continuity and causation [Russell]
7946 The memory criterion has a problem when one thing branches into two things [Williams,B, by Macdonald,C]
1393 One of my future selves will not necessarily be me [Parfit]
5521 If my brain-halves are transplanted into two bodies, I have continuity, and don't need identity [Parfit]
5522 Over a period of time what matters is not that 'I' persist, but that I have psychological continuity [Parfit]
5351 We only have a sense of our self as continuous, not as exactly the same [Flanagan]
23547 It seems absurd that there is no identity of any kind between two objects which involve survival [Fine,K]
5504 Maybe we should see persons in four dimensions, with stages or time-slices at an instant [Martin/Barresi]
5503 Maybe personal identity is not vital in survival, and other continuations would suffice [Martin/Barresi]
7947 In continuity, what matters is not just the beginning and end states, but the process itself [Macdonald,C]