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Single Idea 7948

[filed under theme 9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay ]

Full Idea

Because a statue and the lump of matter that constitute it have different persistence conditions, they are not identical.

Gist of Idea

A statue and its matter have different persistence conditions, so they are not identical

Source

Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.4)

Book Ref

Macdonald,Cynthia: 'Varieties of Things' [Blackwell 2005], p.172

A Reaction

Maybe being a statue is a relational property? All the relational properties of a thing will have different persistence conditions. Suppose I see a face in a bowl of sugar, and you don't?

The 32 ideas from 'Varieties of Things'

7923 'Did it for the sake of x' doesn't involve a sake, so how can ontological commitments be inferred? [Macdonald,C]
7965 Does the knowledge of each property require an infinity of accompanying knowledge? [Macdonald,C]
7926 We 'individuate' kinds of object, and 'identify' particular specimens [Macdonald,C]
7927 At different times Leibniz articulated three different versions of his so-called Law [Macdonald,C]
7928 The Identity of Indiscernibles is false, because it is not necessarily true [Macdonald,C]
7936 Unlike bundles of properties, substances have an intrinsic unity [Macdonald,C]
7930 The bundle theory of substance implies the identity of indiscernibles [Macdonald,C]
7932 A phenomenalist cannot distinguish substance from attribute, so must accept the bundle view [Macdonald,C]
7937 When we ascribe a property to a substance, the bundle theory will make that a tautology [Macdonald,C]
7939 Substances persist through change, but the bundle theory says they can't [Macdonald,C]
7940 A substance might be a sequence of bundles, rather than a single bundle [Macdonald,C]
7929 A substance is either a bundle of properties, or a bare substratum, or an essence [Macdonald,C]
7941 Each substance contains a non-property, which is its substratum or bare particular [Macdonald,C]
7942 The substratum theory explains the unity of substances, and their survival through change [Macdonald,C]
7943 A substratum has the quality of being bare, and they are useless because indiscernible [Macdonald,C]
7934 Tropes are abstract (two can occupy the same place), but not universals (they have locations) [Macdonald,C]
7938 Relational properties are clearly not essential to substances [Macdonald,C]
7944 Reduce by bridge laws (plus property identities?), by elimination, or by reducing talk [Macdonald,C]
7947 In continuity, what matters is not just the beginning and end states, but the process itself [Macdonald,C]
7948 A statue and its matter have different persistence conditions, so they are not identical [Macdonald,C]
7933 Don't assume that a thing has all the properties of its parts [Macdonald,C]
7950 Philosophy tries to explain how the actual is possible, given that it seems impossible [Macdonald,C]
7958 Properties are sets of exactly resembling property-particulars [Macdonald,C]
7967 Being taller is an external relation, but properties and substances have internal relations [Macdonald,C]
7955 Resemblance Nominalism cannot explain either new resemblances, or absence of resemblances [Macdonald,C]
7961 A 'thing' cannot be in two places at once, and two things cannot be in the same place at once [Macdonald,C]
7959 How do a group of resembling tropes all resemble one another in the same way? [Macdonald,C]
7960 Trope Nominalism is the only nominalism to introduce new entities, inviting Ockham's Razor [Macdonald,C]
7951 Numerical sameness is explained by theories of identity, but what explains qualitative identity? [Macdonald,C]
7964 How can universals connect instances, if they are nothing like them? [Macdonald,C]
7971 Real Nominalism is only committed to concrete particulars, word-tokens, and (possibly) sets [Macdonald,C]
7972 Tropes are abstract particulars, not concrete particulars, so the theory is not nominalist [Macdonald,C]