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Full Idea
Davidson points out that we can only make sense of patterns of behaviour such as excuses if events can have more than one description. So I flip the light switch, turn on the light, illuminate the room, and alert a prowler, but I do only one thing.
Gist of Idea
Varied descriptions of an event will explain varied behaviour relating to it
Source
report of Donald Davidson (Action, Reasons and Causes [1963]) by Cynthia Macdonald - Varieties of Things Ch.5
Book Ref
Macdonald,Cynthia: 'Varieties of Things' [Blackwell 2005], p.185
A Reaction
We can distinguish an event as an actual object, and as an intentional object. We can probably individuate intentional events quite well (according to our interests), but actual 'events' seem to flow into one another and overlap.
| 6402 | In 1927, Russell analysed force and matter in terms of events [Russell, by Grayling] |
| 7949 | Varied descriptions of an event will explain varied behaviour relating to it [Davidson, by Macdonald,C] |
| 8348 | If we don't assume that events exist, we cannot make sense of our common talk [Davidson] |
| 9843 | You can't identify events by causes and effects, as the event needs to be known first [Dummett on Davidson] |
| 14602 | Events can only be individuated causally [Davidson, by Schaffer,J] |
| 14004 | We need events for action statements, causal statements, explanation, mind-and-body, and adverbs [Davidson, by Bourne] |
| 15268 | Humeans construct their objects from events, but we construct events from objects [Harré/Madden] |
| 8308 | Events are ontologically indispensable for singular causal explanations [Lowe] |
| 4221 | Maybe modern physics requires an event-ontology, rather than a thing-ontology [Lowe] |
| 12839 | Relativity has an ontology of things and events, not on space-time diagrams [Simons] |
| 20467 | Quantum mechanics describes the world entirely as events [Rovelli] |