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Single Idea 7954
[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
]
Full Idea
When we have found a resemblance among several objects, that often occur to us, we apply the same name to all of them, whatever differences we may observe in the degrees of their quantity and quality, and whatever other differences may appear among them.
Gist of Idea
If we see a resemblance among objects, we apply the same name to them, despite their differences
Source
David Hume (Treatise of Human Nature [1739], I.I.7)
Book Ref
Hume,David: 'A Treatise of Human Nature', ed/tr. Mossner,Ernest C. [Penguin 1969], p.67
A Reaction
This must to some extent by right, whatever objections can be found. Russell's objection (Idea 4441) wouldn't alter the truth of Hume's observation, thought Hume is attacking universals and Russell defending them.
Related Idea
Idea 4441
'Resemblance Nominalism' won't work, because the theory treats resemblance itself as a universal [Russell]
The
23 ideas
with the same theme
[universals are groups of resembling particulars]:
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5015
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A universal is a single idea applied to individual things that are similar to one another
[Descartes]
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6714
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Universals do not have any intrinsic properties, but only relations to particulars
[Berkeley]
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11098
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Momentary impressions are wrongly identified with one another on the basis of resemblance
[Hume, by Quine]
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7954
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If we see a resemblance among objects, we apply the same name to them, despite their differences
[Hume]
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23649
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No one thinks two sheets possess a single whiteness, but all agree they are both white
[Reid]
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4441
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'Resemblance Nominalism' won't work, because the theory treats resemblance itself as a universal
[Russell]
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7956
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If all and only red things were round things, we would need to specify the 'respect' of the resemblance
[Goodman, by Macdonald,C]
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7957
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Without respects of resemblance, we would collect blue book, blue pen, red pen, red clock together
[Goodman, by Macdonald,C]
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8532
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Resemblances must be in certain 'respects', and they seem awfully like properties
[Armstrong]
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4439
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'Resemblance Nominalism' says properties are resemblances between classes of particulars
[Armstrong]
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4440
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'Resemblance Nominalism' finds that in practice the construction of resemblance classes is hard
[Armstrong]
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8500
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Colour resemblance isn't just resemblance between things; 'colour' must be mentioned
[Jackson]
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8521
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Nominalism has the problem that without humans nothing would resemble anything else
[Campbell,K]
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7009
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Similarity among modes will explain everthing universals were for
[Heil]
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7041
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Similar objects have similar properties; properties are directly similar
[Heil]
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7720
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Two things can only resemble one another in some respect, and that may reintroduce a universal
[Lowe]
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9447
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If properties are clusters of powers, this can explain why properties resemble in degrees
[Mumford]
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4458
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Unlike Class Nominalism, Resemblance Nominalism can distinguish natural from unnatural classes
[Moreland]
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9472
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Resemblance itself needs explanation, presumably in terms of something held in common
[Bird]
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7955
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Resemblance Nominalism cannot explain either new resemblances, or absence of resemblances
[Macdonald,C]
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18435
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Resemblance Nominalists say that resemblance explains properties (not the other way round)
[Rodriquez-Pereyra]
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18436
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Entities are truthmakers for their resemblances, so no extra entities or 'resemblances' are needed
[Rodriquez-Pereyra]
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18437
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Resemblance nominalism requires a second entity to explain 'the rose is crimson'
[Edwards]
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