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Single Idea 7956

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism ]

Full Idea

According to Goodman's 'companionship difficulty', resemblance nominalism has a problem if, say, all and only the red things were the round things, because we cannot distinguish the two different respects in which the things resemble one another.

Gist of Idea

If all and only red things were round things, we would need to specify the 'respect' of the resemblance

Source

report of Nelson Goodman (The Structure of Appearance [1951]) by Cynthia Macdonald - Varieties of Things Ch.6

Book Ref

Macdonald,Cynthia: 'Varieties of Things' [Blackwell 2005], p.230


A Reaction

Goodman opts for extreme linguististic nominalism in response to this (Idea 7952), whereas Russell opts for a sort of Platonism (4441). The current idea gives Russell a further problem, of needing a universal of the respect of the resemblance.

Related Idea

Idea 4441 'Resemblance Nominalism' won't work, because the theory treats resemblance itself as a universal [Russell]


The 30 ideas from Nelson Goodman

Goodman argued that the confirmation relation can never be formalised [Goodman, by Horsten/Pettigrew]
Goodman showed that every sound inductive argument has an unsound one of the same form [Goodman, by Putnam]
Dispositions seem more ethereal than behaviour; a non-occult account of them would be nice [Goodman]
We don't use laws to make predictions, we call things laws if we make predictions with them [Goodman]
If the result is bad, we change the rule; if we like the rule, we reject the result [Goodman]
Art is like understanding a natural language, and needs a grasp of a symbol system [Goodman, by Gardner]
Artistic symbols are judged by the fruitfulness of their classifications [Goodman, by Giovannelli]
A performance is only an instance of a work if there is not a single error [Goodman]
A copy only becomes an 'instance' of an artwork if there is a system of notation [Goodman]
Art is a referential activity, hence indefinable, but it has a set of symptoms [Goodman]
Counterfactuals are true if logical or natural laws imply the consequence [Goodman, by McFetridge]
If all and only red things were round things, we would need to specify the 'respect' of the resemblance [Goodman, by Macdonald,C]
Without respects of resemblance, we would collect blue book, blue pen, red pen, red clock together [Goodman, by Macdonald,C]
Two objects can apparently make up quite distinct arrangements in sets [Goodman, by Burgess/Rosen]
If we apply the same word to different things, it is only because we are willing to do so [Goodman, by Macdonald,C]
Classes are a host of ethereal, platonic, pseudo entities [Goodman]
The counties of Utah, and the state, and its acres, are in no way different [Goodman]
If the world is one it has many aspects, and if there are many worlds they will collect into one [Goodman]
We lack frames of reference to transform physics, biology and psychology into one another [Goodman]
Without words or other symbols, we have no world [Goodman]
A world can be full of variety or not, depending on how we sort it [Goodman]
Things can only be judged the 'same' by citing some respect of sameness [Goodman]
Grue and green won't be in the same world, as that would block induction entirely [Goodman]
Being primitive or prior always depends on a constructional system [Goodman]
We build our world, and ignore anything that won't fit [Goodman]
Users of digital thermometers recognise no temperatures in the gaps [Goodman]
Truth is irrelevant if no statements are involved [Goodman]
Reality is largely a matter of habit [Goodman]
We don't recognise patterns - we invent them [Goodman]
Discovery is often just finding a fit, like a jigsaw puzzle [Goodman]